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Executive summary 
S1. This report identifies conditions for the successful interactions of national 
security and defence stakeholders in the strategic framework of comprehensive 
security and integrated defence. It reviews the literature on comprehensive and 
integrated approaches to complex security and defence challenges and extracts 
some key factors underpinning the effective whole-of-government and whole-of-
society efforts. It then considers experiences of several nations – Denmark, 
Finland, The Netherlands and Sweden – in building integrated security and 
defence systems. Finally, the paper investigates the ‘state of play’ in Estonia 
when it comes to implementing the concept of integrated defence. It closes with 
the recommendations to Estonia‘s policymakers.  
 Part I: Stakeholder Interactions in Comprehensive Security – 
Conditions for Success 
S2. In this part, the paper argues that the nature of contemporary security 
and defence requires a concerted planning, preparation and action by 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, as no single organisation 
possesses a full spectrum of capabilities required to deal with complex, 
multidimensional and dynamic set of threats and risks. This applies equally to the 
activities at the stages of threat prevention, active countering of actual threats 
and the management of their consequences. The same logic also extends to civil 
emergencies or crises as well as to wars and operations other than war, both on 
home soil and abroad. 
S3. Conditions and measures enabling and facilitating cooperation, 
coordination and collaboration between various stakeholders in order to achieve 
congruence and synergy of their effort are required at different levels. At the 
national level, the nation’s governance and strategic cultures should be 
favourable to bringing different civil security agencies and the military together 
for common planning and operations, instead of purposefully keeping them 
apart. There must also be a broad consensus over the security and defence 
objectives and ways of meeting them.  
S4. At the governmental level, structural and procedural reforms are 
required, such as establishing inter-agency ‘issue-based’ units; creating a proper 
cabinet level planning and oversight mechanism for the entire security and 
defence sector, supported with appropriate inter-agency planning 
methodologies, doctrines and training programmes; harmonising planning 
approaches of various ministries; and increasing capacities for flexible 
networking with non-governmental stakeholders in policymaking as well as in 
planning and conducting security and defence operations. 
S5. Individual agencies should be cognisant of the roles, objectives, 
resources, capabilities and working practices of different stakeholders as well as 
appreciate the costs and benefits of interacting with them. Equally important is 
their readiness for such interactions, ranging from appropriate physical 
infrastructure to organisational procedures and structural arrangements which 
allow connecting with other governmental as well as non-governmental and 
private sector organisations. They should dedicate sufficient resources for 
common training with other stakeholders, while their leaders should be 
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promoting the internal atmosphere and culture encouraging collaboration with 
other organisations. 
S6. The paper finds that conditions even at the team and individual levels are 
very important to successful interaction of security and defence stakeholders. 
Multi-organisational teams should have a shared understanding of the problems 
they are tasked to address as well as use unified terminology. Common training, 
shared physical space, trust-building and appropriate team leadership styles are 
also extremely important elements. However, eventually the entire edifice of 
executing the comprehensive approach rests on the cadre of security and 
defence professionals possessing a broad outlook on security, multi-agency 
working experience and appreciation of differences in the organisational and 
professional cultures of various stakeholders as well as the ability to build and 
maintain relationships with those stakeholders. Culture shifts, major 
organisational changes and behavioural models supporting the whole-of-
government/whole-of-society approach cannot emerge without human 
resources nurtured and managed in the spirit of collaboration. 
S7. Part One concludes that parliaments have an ever important role to play 
in shaping the above conditions at all levels. These range from encouraging frank 
and robust strategic debate on comprehensive security and defence as well as 
passing legislative measures designed to reduce organisational ‘stovepipes’ in 
the government, through exercising government’s accountability for reforms in 
the security and defence sector, and to endorsing candidates for leading 
executive positions possessing the necessary credentials for the whole-of-
government/whole-of-society approach. 
 Part II: National Approaches and Experiences 
S8. Collaboration between different actors responsible for national security, 
in all of its aspects, has long and successful historical tradition in Finland. Until 
the 1990’s, the focus was on how to best marshal the nation’s resources to 
support military defence. Since then, emphasis has been increasingly laid on 
‘comprehensive security’, where military defence is just one, albeit important, of 
the many aspects of security. The aim now is to secure the ‘vital functions of 
society’ in a common effort where the state and municipal authorities, the 
business community, and the various non-governmental organizations 
collaborate with each other to produce highest possible security for the Finnish 
citizen. On the national level, this effort is coordinated by a special committee, 
the Security Committee (previously known as the Security and Defence 
Committee), which has the task of monitoring, planning, preparing, coordinating 
and implementing all the measures taken to improve Finland’s comprehensive 
security.  
S9. Since the millennium, challenges and initiatives have been most prevalent 
in the external domain of Denmark’s policy. This means the efforts have been 
focused in the development of particular and general Danish policies and 
processes with regard to civil-military interaction in stabilization missions as well 
as in contributions to wider peace-time stabilization of fragile states. 
Nonetheless, the internal dimension has also been subject to a set of challenges 
and initiatives. This is notably in emergency management policy where, for 
instance, the principle of sector responsibility (distributed governance) has been 
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under pressure by both cross-cutting challenges like cyber-security but also, in 
regulatory terms, by increased demands from the European Union. Apparently 
too small to establish formalized cross-cutting coordination and implementation 
but big enough to be stove-piped, the Danish central administration and its 
agencies have struggled to identify and implement effective processes and 
institutionalized approaches to comprehensive approach and whole-of-
government mechanisms both at home and abroad. A set of mechanisms has 
nevertheless been established which has furthered Danish government’s ability 
to monitor, implement and plan whole-of-government policies. As a result, 
Danish government abilities to address the new cross-cutting challenges have 
improved. 
S9. The Netherlands’ security policies place a strong emphasis on 
comprehensive solutions to external and internal security challenges. 
Coordinated deployment of instruments available to the government and 
relevant in particular circumstances, or ‘integrated approach’, is a well-
established principle. Despite that, its policy framework remains, by and large, 
split into the external (International Security Strategy) and internal (National 
Security Strategy) vectors, even though they overlap to a certain degree. Both 
strategies stress the importance of mutual awareness between security 
stakeholders as well joint threat assessments, analysis, planning and learning 
mechanisms in implementing the integrated approach. Planning and conduct of 
the external missions is benefiting from a structured, systematic, comprehensive 
and evidence-based Collaborative Decision-Making (CDM) model, which includes 
such key stakeholders as defence, foreign affairs and security and justice 
ministries and which covers political, economic, social and security aspects of 
missions abroad. It is currently being elevated from the operational and tactical 
to a strategic and political level of decision-making. The country is also very 
systematic in defining and pursuing, through the NSS, main building blocks for 
the whole-of-government activities. This includes government-wide analysis 
(strategic foresight, thematic in-depth studies and scenarios, short-term horizon 
scanning and national risk assessment), strategic planning and follow-up.  
S10. Until the end of the Cold War, Sweden’s Total Defence system focused on 
maintaining readiness to defend the nation against an armed attack. The primary 
role of civil defence was to support the Armed Forces. When the military threat 
disappeared in the first half of the 1990’s it took only a few years to dismantle 
the Total Defence system. Organisations were disbanded, planning and exercises 
were cancelled. The Swedish Armed Forces were reorganised and focused on 
operations outside Swedish territory. A new civil crisis management system is 
being introduced but progress has been relatively slow compared to the 
dismantling of the old Total Defence system. Due to radical changes in civil 
society, the new system has to tackle today’s challenges in a different manner 
compared to the system that was in place during the Cold War. 
S11. Part Two concludes that, in all four countries that the report has covered, 
comprehensive thinking in security affairs emerged gradually and is manifested 
in a variety of ways. A striking feature in all cases is the centrality of defence 
organisations to the efforts to implement comprehensive security concepts. This 
is partly due to their set of missions, which include both external and internal 
functions and which span the entire spectrum of situations – from peacetime 
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through crises to wars. This often makes them the central hinge on which 
comprehensive operations rely. It is also partly the legacy of total defence 
paradigm, where defence owned, operated or relied upon large systems 
(including voluntary defence organisations) necessary to channel society’s 
resources to support military defence efforts. The challenge is how to build upon 
this legacy in creating and running whole-of-government/whole-of-society 
systems in pursuit of comprehensive security. 
 Part III: The ‘State of Play’ in Estonia – Challenges of 
Implementing Integrated Defence 
S12. Based on the interviews with government officials it was identified that a 
key facilitator for the application of the whole-of-government approach is broad 
consensus on the underlying principles of the integrated national defence across 
all government actors. The need to implement integrated national defence has 
been widely accepted and supported across all actors of the government. It has 
been generally accepted that all actors have defined roles and responsibilities to 
ensure national defence.  
S13. The everyday operational inter-agency interaction in crisis management 
and in the area of civilian support to the military is good, even though the need 
for greater formalization and regulation of interactions as well as for more 
practical inter-agency training and exercises was noted.  
S14. Major obstacles to the implementation of the integrated defence are rigid 
and outdated mindsets and divergent philosophical understandings across the 
ministries and their agencies concerning the essence of the integrated national 
defence; lack of strategic and long-term planning traditions, procedures, 
regulations and instructions across all governance domains and policy subjects; 
lack of competence, know-how, human and financial resources that inhibit 
strategic planning efforts; and insufficient attention to managing inter-agency 
collaboration.  
S15. Deficiencies with potentially negative implications for national security 
are lack of whole-of-government preparations for wartime responsibilities and 
duties (no legal mandate, attribution of financial resources, and no strategic and 
operational planning in some policy areas); lack of clarity regarding the 
leadership and command structure during some escalation stages (emergency 
situation, state of emergency, wartime), and lack of mandate for a coordinating 
ministry to apply coercive measures if other government actors do not fulfil their 
duties. 
 Conclusions 
S16. The report concludes that committing to a course towards whole-of-
government and whole-of-society approaches is obviously an ambitious 
undertaking with very broad implications as to how security and defence affairs 
should be conducted. Given the scope of the challenge, it is not surprising that 
many countries are making a rather slow progress towards effective whole-of-
government and whole-of-society approaches to security and defence. In many 
regards, Estonia does not stand out as a laggard in pursuing its own whole-of-
government and whole-of-society solutions. The conceptual basis is in place, 
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even if in need of some fine-tuning. Many legal, institutional and organisational 
elements are also emerging, reinforced by various positive examples of 
operational collaboration as well as involvement of non-governmental and 
private sectors. However, there are many weaknesses too, concentrated in the 
areas of strategic planning culture and organisational competence; availability 
and management of human resources; knowledge management (especially in 
translating implicit knowledge to explicit through manuals, handbooks and 
guidelines); management of inter-agency processes in security and defence as 
well as management of stakeholder expectations. Resolving them will take time, 
sustained effort, much good will and patient leadership. 
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Introduction 
This report was produced in response to the knowledge requirement 
formulated by the Defence Commission of the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu), in 
order to stimulate thinking and debate about the implementation of 
comprehensive security and integrated defence concepts.  
Estonia‘s capstone national security and defence documents – National 
Security Concept and National Defence Strategy – established integrated defence 
and comprehensive security as fundamental principles upon which to base the 
nation’s response to a complex and dynamic global, regional and national 
environment of security challenges, risks and threats. However, to have a real 
impact, these principles have to be translated into the requisite institutional 
arrangements, practices and culture, enabling genuine and sustainable 
integrated – whole of government and whole of society – approach.  
The research undertaken in response to the requirement by the ICDS aimed 
to generate a set of recommendations on the implementation of comprehensive 
security and integrated defence principles in Estonia. More specifically, it sought 
to: 
 Identify a set of conditions for the successful implementation of a whole-
of-government/whole-of-society approach to security and defence; 
 Investigate selected foreign practices in implementing whole-of-
government/whole-of-society approach to security and defence; 
 Recommend changes and improvements in the institutional 
arrangements and practices in Estonia. 
The project was based on qualitative research methodology. It included desk 
research focusing on literature which generalises the post-Cold War concepts 
and experience of NATO and the EU countries in pursuing comprehensive 
solutions (e.g. in crisis response operations, complex emergencies management, 
homeland security and defence activities). From this, the generic enablers of 
successful whole of government/whole of society approach at different levels 
were derived. The project also included ’side-sight’ research, or case studies – 
desk and field research into the concepts, arrangements and practices existing in 
several small NATO and the EU countries. This yielded further insights into the 
challenges and ’best practices’ of implementing whole of government/whole of 
society approach to security and defence. Finally, drawing upon desk research 
and an extensive series of interviews, ’state of play’ in Estonia was ascertained, 
in order to identify various positive developments as well as weakness in the 
country’s efforts to implement comprehensive security and broad-based defence 
concept.s 
In Part I, the report identifies the conditions for the successful 
interactions of national security and defence stakeholders in the strategic 
framework of comprehensive security and integrated defence. It reviews the 
literature on comprehensive approaches to complex security and defence 
challenges and extracts some key factors underpinning the effective whole-of-
government and whole-of-society efforts. In Part II, it then considers experiences 
of several nations – Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands and Sweden – in building 
integrated security and defence systems. Finally, in Part III, the paper 
  
Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence | ICDS Report  
 
10 
 
investigates the ‘state of play’ in Estonia when it comes to implementing the 
concept of integrated defence. It closes with the recommendations to Estonia‘s 
policymakers. 
Part I: Stakeholder Interactions in Comprehensive Security 
– Conditions for Success1 
 Introduction 
The philosophy of comprehensive security is put into practice through the 
interactions of various security and defence stakeholders: government agencies, 
public sector and non-government organisations, private sector enterprises and 
local communities. ‘Collaboration’, defined as ‘the action of working with 
someone to produce something’ (Oxford Dictionary), is thus a critical concept in 
implementing a broad approach to security and defence, although this is not the 
only possible form of interaction. 
 The aim of this part of the report is to identify a set of conditions at 
various levels (national, organisational, team and even individual) which enable 
and facilitate interactions, especially collaborative ones, between security and 
defence stakeholders. It draws upon the literature concerning the 
Comprehensive Approach (CA) – the term referring to the concerted action of 
military and non-military actors in a theatre of operations – as well as on related 
concepts such as ‘interagency cooperation’ and the ‘whole-of-government’ 
approach.  
 Although the term ‘Comprehensive Approach’ has been devised with a 
particular kind of operation in mind (‘out-of-area’ crisis response, stabilisation, 
peace support and counterinsurgency), many of its tenets are also applicable in 
the domestic setting. In this setting, civilian actors have to support the military, 
and vice versa, in a wide range of circumstances – from civil emergencies 
through security crises to military contingencies, including defence against 
military aggression.  
 Both ‘out-of-area’ and domestic civil and military operations are ‘complex 
operations’ – involving multiple actors; combining many dimensions (political, 
military, technological, informational, human, environmental, economic, etc.); 
and dealing with a great number of dynamic factors and many uncertainties. It is 
therefore assumed that the conditions for collaboration sought by the 
proponents of a CA are also relevant, to a large extent, in ensuring collaboration 
amongst stakeholders in national broad-based defence and comprehensive 
security. 
 I.1. Setting the scene: some terminology issues 
 Over time, policy and academic discourses have adopted a number of 
terms to depict a holistic approach to security and defence, and the principle of a 
broad and multifaceted response to complex security challenges. Those of 
greatest relevance to this enquiry, in the descending order of their breadth, are: 
                                                 
1
 By Tomas Jermalavičius, Research Fellow, ICDS (tomas.jermalavicius@icds.ee) 
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 Comprehensive security, which is ‘the end-state of a nation’s security 
policy achieved through the coordinated application of the multiplicity of 
government and non-government components and instruments involved 
in developing and maintaining a stable and peaceful environment that 
permits the effective operation of political, economic and social 
institutions for the overall benefit of citizens’ (Fitz-Gerald & Macnamara, 
2012: 4). 
 Comprehensive Approach (CA), understood as the ‘interaction between 
various actors and organisations with the aim of generating coherent 
policy and action during periods of crises or disaster or in a post-conflict 
environment’ (Hull, 2011: 5). 
  Whole-of-Society Approach (WSA) to complex threats and risks, which 
refers to ‘multi-sector, inclusive approaches that unify the experiences 
and resources of government, military, civil society, and the private 
sector’ (Prevent Project, 2011: 27).  
 Whole-of-Government Approach (WGA), which at the most fundamental 
level is a public administration model where ‘horizontal co-ordination and 
integration are embedded in the process of policy design and 
implementation’ (OECD, 2011: 14), or which takes the form of ‘concerted 
and coordinated interagency effort to apply all elements of government 
power’ (Stickler, 2010: 4).2  
 It is also necessary to note that the interactions between various actors 
and organisations in security and defence can take many forms and levels. 
According to Stickler (2010: 7), these range from very basic (consultation) and 
elementary (cooperation) to intermediate (coordination) and advanced 
(collaboration) (the features of each are briefly described in the table below). 
 
Table: Interagency maturity levels (Stickler, 2010: 7) 
                                                 
2
 More definitions of various terms used in security and defence discourses, including in Estonia, 
are provided in the Appendix. 
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 I.2. Conditions at the national level 
 One of the first factors determining the ease with which a particular 
nation‘s civilian and military agencies, as well as other organisations, interact is 
the tradition and culture of its security governance. In many nations concerned 
about the inherent power of the military and the possibility of its misuse, and in 
nations with a strong tradition of ‘checks and balances’, there is a strict legal 
separation of the armed forces and other security organisations (Miani, 2010). 
The importance of this separation is built into the very constitutional fabric of 
the nation. It is also often manifested in strict limits placed on the peacetime 
activities of the military on domestic soil, to the point of banning the military 
from directing any civilian activity. 
In the context of such a tradition and culture, military and civilian 
organisations lack the habits, incentives and arrangements that would facilitate 
their collaboration; they tend to stick to their ‘stovepipes’, defend their turf and 
hold rather hostile views of one another. Even after 9/11 – with the ensuing 
emphasis on better integrated homeland security solutions and on a 
comprehensive approach in overseas operations –change in such nations is 
taking place very slowly. For instance, only recently, following a ruling of its 
Constitutional Court, Germany has begun to allow a very limited role for its 
armed forces on German territory to counter assaults which threaten 
‘catastrophic consequences’ (BBC News, 2012). The US, meanwhile, is struggling 
to integrate diplomacy, development and defence instruments in theatres of 
operations, often without a corresponding alignment of the respective agencies 
in the capital (Schnaubelt, 2009). 
 At the other end of the spectrum, there are countries with a long-
standing tradition of ‘total’ defence, adept at thinking about and preparing to 
deploy all national resources to meet the overriding objective of fending off 
military aggression, or countries with experience in fighting protracted 
insurgencies, where the boundaries of military and civilian (law enforcement, 
intelligence, security) organisations have blurred and their activities 
intermingled. This experience is particularly applicable today, when the dividing 
lines between external and internal security are becoming obscured due to the 
rise of trans-national security issues such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, organised crime, disruption of critical infrastructure and 
services (e.g. by means of cyber attacks), etc. (Lutterbeck, 2005). 
 In practice, these conditions may not necessarily lead to a smooth WGA: 
indeed, competition between various agencies could be just as pronounced or, in 
the case of a total defence mind-set, one agency (the military) might be too 
dominant. On the other hand, such a tradition and culture within security 
governance leads to more experience with cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration, better informal networking habits and more positive attitudes 
towards the criss-crossing of agency lines and the reaching out to all relevant 
stakeholders (e.g. as in the UK; see Baumann, 2010). Involving non-governmental 
stakeholders in overall security and defence efforts also comes more naturally to 
such security governance cultures. 
 A second powerful national-level factor determining the intensity of 
interaction between various agencies is the existence of meaningful (as opposed 
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to superficial) political, strategic and societal consensus regarding the overall 
national security ends, ways and means, and regarding the goals of participating 
in particular civil-military operations (Stepputat, 2009; Fitz-Gerald & Macnamara, 
2012). Without such a consensus, different actors within and outside 
government find it difficult to relate their mission, daily activities and initiatives 
to a broader picture and with one another; they become driven by narrow 
agency interests and short-term opportunities (Jennings, 2010).  
 In turn, reaching a meaningful political and strategic consensus requires a 
culture of continuous dialogue and compromise, which is itself hard to achieve 
in the highly competitive realm of politics and amidst rivalry for limited 
resources. As Rotman (2010: 4) puts it when writing about national-level 
fragmentation as an obstacle to CA, ‘all major players needed for a truly 
Comprehensive Approach face bureaucratic and political incentives that largely 
favour parochial interests over investing in common solutions’. 
 I.3. Government level conditions 
 To overcome the institutional fragmentation and to make WGA work, it is 
often necessary to undertake certain government-level procedural adjustments 
and institutional restructuring. 
 First and foremost, this entails creating and maintaining a proper joint 
cabinet-level analysis, planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation and 
funding mechanism through which multifunctional strategies can be processed. 
In most cases, this requires a cabinet-level unit dedicated to coordinating 
security and defence policies and strategies as well as amalgamating the inputs 
(including financial ones) of various agencies. In addition, ‘issue-based units’ 
(e.g. counter-terrorism, cyber security, etc.) under cabinet supervision and 
staffed by personnel from various agencies, are necessary to overcome 
institutional ‘stovepipes’ and address the issues which cut across agency lines 
(Stepputat, 2009; Miani, 2010; Hull, 2011). As Fitz-Gerald and Macnamara (2012: 
6) argue, ‘the efforts of one unit within a ministerial portfolio on its own neither 
will, nor should, provide the leadership and modus operandi for comprehensive 
security’. 
 Furthermore, civilian agencies in particular need to grapple with the fact 
that, compared to military organisations, they lack vertical integration as ‘they 
do not have the equivalent of operational level headquarters to bridge the gap 
between national-level policy/strategy and tactical actions on the ground’ 
(Schnaubelt, 2009: 37). This makes civil-military integration at the operational 
level particularly difficult and often leaves no choice but to rely, for operational 
planning purposes, on military command structures with a few civilians inserted 
into them – hardly an optimal organisational solution for ‘complex operations’ in 
which the military’s contribution is just a small part of the overall effort. 
 On the other hand, it has often been noted that broad and ambitious 
organisational reforms undertaken by governments in order to enable WGA and 
CA have not taken off in most countries, while more limited process-oriented 
changes (especially in joint planning and inter-agency project management) have 
been more useful. These lesser measures ‘have helped to reduce transaction 
costs, facilitate communication among departments, and pool expertise and 
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resources from different corners of the government architecture’ (Baumann, 
2012: 36), but without threatening the organisational identity of separate 
agencies. 
 Coherence of government policy and an overarching consensus-based 
vision for security and defence matter a great deal in facilitating interaction 
between different agencies and non-governmental stakeholders. As Jennings 
(2011: 105) puts it, ‘in the absence of an integrated strategic vision, agencies go 
rogue – driven by mandates, not strategy’. According to Hull (2011: 8), it 
assumed that ‘a government’s engagement in a conflict or disaster will cost 
fewer resources and be more likely to achieve greater and more sustainable 
impact if the ministries share the same understanding of the problem and have a 
shared and well-sequenced strategy to address it’. However, this has to be 
supplemented with efforts to harmonise the strategic planning, capability 
development and operational deployment processes and practices of the various 
governmental organisations with a role in national security and defence.  
 Different organisations employ different planning methodologies, are 
driven by varying time horizons and have very different approaches to building 
capabilities, managing projects and exercising leadership, making their 
cooperation, coordination and especially their collaboration quite complicated 
tasks. These differences are especially pronounced between civilian agencies on 
the one hand and military organisations on the other, but they also exist 
between various civilian agencies. As Schnaubelt (2009: 41) notes: 
The military in some ways is like a fire department – only a relatively small portion of its 
total number is engaged in operations at any particular time. The remainder is in reserve 
waiting for a call to action, or in training, or undergoing a ‘re-set’ to prepare for a 
specific future operation. Civilian agencies are more like a police department – nearly all 
of their personnel are engaged in current operations with almost no float for training 
and virtually none being held in reserve.  
 Governments are thus advised to ‘establish a permanent, enduring, and 
robust education, training, doctrine, materiel and organisational approach 
among the various agencies’ (Caslen & Loudon, 2011) involved in ‘complex 
operations’ which require cross-functional inputs and inter-agency efforts.  
 Interaction between government agencies is also often hampered by a 
lack of technical and administrative interoperability, especially when it comes to 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information (C4I), logistics, 
various standard operating procedures (SOPs), knowledge management systems 
(data collection, fusion and sharing) and even personnel management (e.g. 
rotation cycles). Indeed, interagency interoperability – or ’thick and frequent 
interaction among the organisations and individuals involved in complex 
engagement spaces as they engage in planning, decisionmaking and operations’ 
(Hallett & Thorngren, 2011: 42) – should be considered as part of an agency’s 
capability set (other capability components being Doctrine, Organisation, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities).  
 Extending this aspect further, it should be noted that, at the strategic and 
operational levels, all governmental agencies must have a common operating 
picture, built by fusing data from different sources and agencies and through this 
develop a common understanding of complex security situations (Bryan & 
Pendall, 2010: 5). As Strickler writes (2010: 6), ‘information exchange or 
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information sharing is a fundamental building block of cooperative efforts’. This 
is hardly possible without technical and procedural interoperability. 
 If the WGA is often impaired by legal, cultural, organisational and 
technical issues, it is even more difficult to achieve a WSA. CA proponents argue 
for the integration, or at least consultation, of non-governmental partners in the 
joint effort of drafting strategies, policies and their implementation plans, and in 
the planning and conduct of operations. However, the diversity of such partners 
– ranging from humanitarian and development NGOs to private contractors, 
each with very diverse missions, objectives, cultures, identities, principles, 
practices, resources and capabilities – makes this a particularly challenging 
undertaking. For instance, for humanitarian organisations, ‘independence, 
impartiality and neutrality is the common denominator’ (Friis, 2010: 19); they 
distance themselves from politically-motivated activities, and differ significantly 
in their views on the use of force or in decision-making styles from, for example, 
military organisations (Egnell, 2013).  
 Thus, one of the key preconditions for involving non-government actors 
in security and defence efforts is an ability to practise flexible, networked forms 
of interaction with them (Baumann, 2012; Lira, 2010), rather than trying to prod 
them into a hierarchical relationship and command them with top-down 
directives. It also requires a capacity to be selective in the kind of interaction that 
is pursued with these actors (e.g. only consultation and de-confliction of 
activities in the theatre of operations, or coordination and close collaboration). 
Government inter-agency operational and strategic headquarters need to ensure 
that the necessary infrastructure (e.g. non-classified communication networks 
and databases) is available to ‘plug’  trusted and relevant non-governmental 
actors into governmental processes, so as to be able to seamlessly exchange 
information, consult, coordinate and collaborate with these actors. 
 I.4. Agency, team and individual level considerations 
 Many prerequisites for a successful WGA lie within the agencies 
themselves and may require efforts to make internal reforms and adjustments. 
The type and nature of a particular mission, however, will strongly determine 
how those agencies define themselves and conduct their business. As Jennings 
(2011: 91) explains, ‘differences stem from competing institutional mandates, 
missions, legal and resources constraints, as well as culture, mind-set, strategic 
outlook and expectant time horizons.’ 
 Miani (2010; 13-14) distinguishes between process-oriented 
organisations (such as a diplomatic service for which operations ‘can never truly 
end’ and there are in any case no perfect solutions, only sub-optimal outcomes; 
thus they see little need to engage in thorough planning) and goal-oriented 
organisations (such as the military, whose ‘operations are divided into discrete 
events that have identifiable start and end points’ and where optimal outcomes 
can be defined, along with detailed plans to achieve them). In a similar vein, 
cultural differences flowing from the nature of mission exist between the civilian 
agencies (intelligence, law enforcement, rescue, etc.).  
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 I.4.1 Agency characteristics 
 Cultural differences are more difficult to address within agencies than 
structural or legal obstacles. Agencies which succeed in the WGA and WSA 
setting, despite the above differences identified by Miani, are usually 
distinguished by the following key characteristics: 
(1) Ability to identify other actors of importance to their mission or to 
particular tasks (Petersen & Binnendijk, 2007; Hull, 2011); 
(2) Good understanding of those actors: their missions, responsibilities, 
cultures, motives, goals, working practices, resources, capabilities, 
comparative advantages, weaknesses and strengths, as well as their 
added value in resolving various security issues. Conversely, they also are 
cognisant of which of their own capabilities and resources are relevant to 
the missions and tasks of other actors, as well as the circumstances in and 
the means by which they can be provided (Davidson et al, 1996; 
Schnaubelt. 2009; Bryan & Pendall, 2010; Lira, 2010; Hallet & Thorngren, 
2011; Hull, 2011; Fox, 2011; van der Goor & Major, 2012). 
(3) Understanding of the tangible benefits of cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration with those actors (i.e. they recognise existing 
interdependencies), as well as the costs and limits of those interactions. 
The latter are particular pertinent as regards the involvement of various 
non-governmental actors, some of whom do not wish to be seen as 
adjuncts to the government (Caslen & Loudon, 2011; van de Goor & 
Major 2012; Baumann, 2012). 
(4) Having the internal arrangements necessary to interact with external 
actors (e.g. clear points of contact; binding exchange procedures; flexible 
command and control, enabling quick plug-in by other organisations; 
shared ‘lessons learned’ databases, etc.) (Davidson et al, 1996; Petersen 
& Binnendijk, 2007; Lindley-French, 2010; Hull, 2011). 
(5) Dedicating sufficient resources for WGA and WSA-related interactions, 
and especially for training together with other agencies (Strickler, 2010; 
Fox, 2011). 
(6) Promotion and support by senior leadership of ‘atmospheres where the 
spirit of cooperation, collaboration and teamwork is encouraged, and 
where the negative effects of suspicion, infighting, and self-interested 
agendas are eliminated’ (Caslen & Loudon, 2011: 9). 
 These characteristics allow agencies to act as ‘smart customers’ of 
services provided by other agencies, and to be ‘smart providers’ of their own 
services to other agencies.  
 I.4.2 Team characteristics 
 Once inter-agency ‘working groups’, ‘task forces’ or ‘issue-based units’ 
have been formed to advance a comprehensive security agenda, the success of a 
WGA to a large extent rests on the dynamics within these teams. The main 
factors facilitating their work – be it at the strategic, operational or tactical level 
– include: 
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(1) Shared assumptions and understanding of the task or problem at hand, 
the team objectives, the mix of available tools and competences, and the 
impact of the team’s outcomes on the overall strategy (Lacquement, 
2010; Jennings, 2011; Lindley-French, 2010; Lira, 2010); 
(2) Unified language (terminology), formats and style of communication 
(Waddell, 2011; van der Goor & Major, 2012; Davidson et al, 1996). As 
Caslen and Louson (2011: 12) articulate, ‘introducing a common language 
for interagency efforts would help eliminate the confusion associated 
with the various terminologies unique to each agency’;  
(3) Ability of a team to harness the unavoidable frictions between its 
members from diverse backgrounds: ‘While often perceived as an 
indicator of failure, confrontation and friction among organisations may 
well be signs that a genuinely comprehensive approach is at work’ 
(Baumann, 2012: 42); 
(4) Nuanced peer-leadership style (Bryan & Pendall: 2010) rather than the 
hierarchical, top-down, commander-centric approach inherent to military 
organisations. As Schnaubelt (2009: 66) observes, ‘civilian leaders will 
typically expect to be treated as equals rather than subordinate to the 
military commander.’ This is especially important in teams whose 
participants include non-governmental stakeholders, who do not 
appreciate a ‘command and control’ approach and need to be persuaded 
rather than ordered to contribute or coordinate; 
(5) For operational and tactical inter-agency teams, common team training is 
essential (Fox, 2011), to the point that it is desirable that operational 
teams are drawn from the same people who trained together (a natural 
order of things for mobilised military reservists, but somehow not for 
civil-military teams). For strategic-level inter-agency teams, a common 
educational background (e.g. from inter-agency courses and 
programmes) and mutual awareness training is very important; 
(6) Shared physical space (Hull, 2011; Hallett & Thorngren, 2011). The rise of 
technological means enabling virtual collaboration over distances is very 
beneficial in terms of cultivating ‘communities of practice’ to share 
knowledge across organisational boundaries. However, teams working 
within a shared physical space perform better in terms of congruence of 
effort, communication and coordination effectiveness, etc. Thus, as 
Hallett and Thorngren (2011: 45) put it, ‘the main question in facilities 
related CA capability development is “Do our facilities make interaction 
easier, or create additional barriers to interaction?”’. 
 I.4.3 Individual characteristics 
 Success in the CA setting is also shaped by factors even at the individual 
level. This is a reality worth taking into account by organisations (such as 
parliamentary committees) which have a role in selecting, vetting and appointing 
individuals for key positions crucial to implementing comprehensive security and 
defence strategies and cross-cutting policies. CA requires a cadre of highly 
knowledgeable, goal-oriented and diplomatic individuals in the right places and 
at the right time. Such individuals should possess and continuously demonstrate: 
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(1) A ‘generalist’ profile and an ability to move and work between different 
agencies. In some countries, there has been a talk of creating a pool of 
‘national security professionals’ (Baumann, 2012) with a ‘comprehensive’ 
mind-set and skills (i.e. possessing a holistic view of the national security 
system and positive attitudes towards collaboration) (Bryan & Pendall, 
2010); 
(2) Ability to appreciate and handle differences in the professional cultures 
represented in the inter-agency teams (Rotmann, 2010); 
(3) Agility, adaptivity and ability to see trends and opportunities emerging 
in a complex strategic, operational and tactical environment (Caslen & 
Loudon, 2010); 
(4) Highly developed inter-personal skills and ability to connect and build 
relations with other stakeholders. As Caslen and Loudon (2011:11) put it, 
‘partnerships are defined by value of mutual benefit, developed by 
interpersonal skills’. 
(5) Negotiation, persuasion and indirect influence skills, which arenecessary 
to build consensus and shape the outcomes of multi-stakeholder 
interactions in a way that does not antagonise the various actors 
important to a particular mission or to the overall security and defence 
strategy (Lacquement, 2010). 
 As such individuals do not appear overnight, governments have to invest 
significant resources, time and sustained effort to build professional education, 
development, advancement and evaluation programmes and personnel 
rotation systems which promote and reward the above traits. As Lacquement 
(2010: 10) writes, ‘a key approach is to do more to educate the leaders of both 
communities [civilian and military – T.J.] to be better prepared for <…> complex 
security challenges. Among the means that can help accomplish this are 
education, training, development, and assignment policies that do more to share 
the relevant expertise of civilian and military leaders across their respective 
domains’ and ‘…to ensure that the ranks of civilian and military leaders include 
generalists who can make such complex operations work’. 
 Culture shifts, fundamental organisational changes and behavioural 
models supporting WGA and WSA cannot emerge without human resources 
nurtured and managed in the spirit of collaboration. This is perhaps the most 
important lesson which governments pursuing comprehensive, integrated 
solutions to contemporary security challenges have often failed to heed. 
 Part I Conclusions 
 Acknowledging the multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of 
contemporary security and defence entails accepting that effective solutions to 
national security challenges cannot come from separate organisations, or even 
nations. This applies equally to activities at the stages of threat prevention, 
active counter-activities and the management of consequences. The same logic 
also extends to complex emergencies or crises, to wars, and to operations on 
home soil and abroad. The national agencies responsible for managing the 
various aspects of security have to reach out beyond their organisational and 
national boundaries in order to succeed. Concerted efforts by governmental, 
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non-governmental (including the private sector and the academia), inter-
governmental and supra-national actors are often the key to resolving national, 
regional and global security issues. 
 Even when the management of a security situation falls within the area of 
responsibility of a particular single organisation, its resources might not be 
sufficient to cope with adverse circumstances. This would necessitate the 
marshalling of the resources of other organisations – be they governmental, 
public or private, foreign (allied) or national. Thus WGA, WSA and, furthermore, 
whole-of-alliance imperatives are particularly strong in small states, both in the 
case of large-scale emergencies or crises and in wartime. 
 In turn, the success of a comprehensive and integrated response to 
complex national security challenges rests on the ability of the involved actors to 
cooperate, coordinate and collaborate. The particular choice of the form of 
interaction is context-specific: it depends on the particular contingency, its 
demands, and the character of the organisations which are responsible for 
managing it or can add value to this effort. It is clear, though, that many general 
conditions must be in place in order for those interactions to succeed. These 
conditions span the national, governmental, single organisation and even team 
and individual levels. 
 Key Insights from Part I 
 Parliaments have an important role in shaping the conditions for success 
at all levels.  
 They can shape the nation’s political and strategic debate and, 
eventually, culture so that it moves in the direction of endorsing a 
comprehensive approach.  
 They have a special responsibility for forging a broad strategic 
consensus in the country concerning the ways that the means and ends 
of security and defence are matched, with a particular emphasis on 
cooperation, coordination and collaboration in the framework of 
WGA/WSA.  
 They can stimulate adjustments in governmental architecture and 
practices (e.g. long-term planning and budgeting, interagency concept 
development, interagency training) through cabinet accountability 
mechanisms (including budgetary appropriations).  
 They can also work to remove legal obstacles hindering interaction 
between government agencies and create incentives for them to reform 
themselves in order to accommodate the demands stemming from 
WGA/WSA.  
 They can even shape conditions at the individual level by endorsing 
candidates with the right credentials for a comprehensive approach for 
key positions in security and defence sector. 
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Part II: National Approaches and Experiences 
 Introduction 
As part of this report, ICDS has looked at the experiences of several nations 
in building their WGA/WSA systems in the context of comprehensive security 
and the comprehensive approach in international operations. The four nations 
that have been chosen are either members of the EU or NATO (or both) and are 
relatively small. All four – Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden – have 
been undertaking transformation of their security and defence systems since the 
end of the Cold War and, by and large, have been active in foreign missions and 
in addressing new cross-cutting security challenges. This part of the report 
describes the approaches, challenges and solutions found in these four 
countries. 
 II.1 Denmark3 
 II.1.1 Background 
Since the turn of the millennium, cross-cutting challenges and initiatives 
have been most prevalent in the external domain of Danish policy, for example in 
the development of particular and general Danish policies and processes with 
regard to civil-military cooperation in stabilisation missions, as well as in 
contributions to the wider peace-time stabilisation of fragile states. Nonetheless, 
the internal dimension has also seen a set of similar challenges and initiatives, 
notably in emergency management policy where, for example, the principle of 
sector responsibility (distributed governance) has been under pressure from 
both cross-cutting challenges like cyber-security and, in regulatory terms, from 
increased demands from the EU.  
In Denmark, the range of new security-related cross-sector tasks in the 
post-Cold War period has posed a fundamental challenge to the classical division 
of labour among ministries and agencies. Apparently too small to establish 
formal cross-cutting coordination and implementation, but big enough to be 
stove-piped, the Danish central administration and its agencies have struggled to 
identify and implement effective processes and institutionalised approaches to 
the comprehensive approach and to whole-of-government mechanisms both at 
home and abroad.  
A set of mechanisms has nevertheless been established, furthering the 
ability of the Danish government to monitor, implement and plan whole-of-
government policies. As a result, Danish government efforts to address the new 
cross-cutting challenges have improved over the period in question. 
Nonetheless, the impression remains that these changes have been relatively 
minor or even cosmetic in some cases. This points to a need for continued 
attention to the strengths and weaknesses related not only to the formal 
institutionalised approaches, but also to the role that the bureaucratic cultural 
                                                 
3
 By Dr Henrik Breitenbauch, Senior Researcher, Centre for Military Studies, University of 
Copenhagen. 
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preference for flexibility and informality plays with regard to inter-ministerial 
coordination and collaboration in Denmark. 
 II.1.2 External challenges and initiatives  
In policies related to external security , including foreign, security, 
defence, development, and intelligence, Denmark has since the turn of the 
millennium been faced with a set of challenges which closely resembles those of 
other countries that have participated in international military interventions. 
Danish foreign and security policy has, since the end of the Cold War, been 
predicated on the increased geopolitical action space that resulted from the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction in the role of 
Russia in Danish security geography. In an American world order, however, 
international institutions could not be taken for granted. Denmark coupled this 
concern with an ability to act more freely under the new setup to support 
international stability and the global institutions of the American order; Danish 
foreign policy has since been defined by the resulting so-called activism. While 
there is no formal capstone document capturing this position, it is nevertheless 
explained in a number of strategic guidance documents such as government 
plans, defence commission reports and strategic documents from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) (e.g. Regeringen, 2011; 
Statsministeriet, 2013; Ministry of Defence, 2009, see also Breitenbauch, 2008).  
In addition, an annual official statement on the state of Danish foreign 
policy is given by the Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the 
Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (e.g. Grube, 2013). In practice, however, the 
overarching mechanism for steering Danish foreign policy is an informal 
consensus among leading politicians and civil servants about the general concept 
of activism, if not about its concrete application. This ambiguity allows for 
relative continuity in terms of level of ambition, even if every new government 
has applied new interpretations of degree, as can be seen in the changing 
government statement of plans (Statsministeriet, 2013).  
Already in the 1990s, participation in international peace support 
operations in the Balkans made the Danish military an important element in 
Danish contributions to international order. The changed role of the Danish 
Armed Forces led to a greater emphasis on international missions in the 1999 
Defence Agreement for 2000-2004 (MOD, 2013a). Danish defence policy is 
traditionally characterised by broad Parliamentary support, and participation in 
the development of the defence agreement, which normally runs for a five-year 
period, is seen a as a badge of maturity for political parties. The agreement 
covers budget, strategic rationales (tasks) as well as strategic and concrete 
planning and reforms, including all dimensions of defence policy such as 
personnel, materiel acquisitions, basing structure, etc. The document normally 
runs between 20 and 35 pages. Spokesmen for the political parties that have 
signed the agreement de facto act as part of a larger ministerial function -- as a 
kind of board for Danish defence policy.  
Since 9/11, the interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Mali have 
demonstrated how central military missions have become to Danish foreign 
policy. In a trademark contribution to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Denmark 
provided a battlegroup (~750 men) from 2006-2014 in Helmand province and 
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Regional Command (South)/ Regional Command (South West), alongside the 
United Kingdom, Estonia and later the United States. The forces were deployed 
without national caveats and have been engaged in some of the most severe 
fighting in ISAF. Denmark has sustained one of the highest per capita casualty 
rates in ISAF. Before this major contribution to ISAF, Denmark notably 
contributed forces, again alongside the United Kingdom, in the Basra region 
following the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
Following a strategic review in 2003, international operations became 
the primary raison d’être for the armed forces, as set out in the 2004 Defence 
Agreement, which covered the period 2005-2009 (Bruun-udvalget, 2003; MOD, 
2004a). Some domestic functions remained in terms of upholding sovereignty 
(air policing), search and rescue, VIP flights, environmental surveillance, as 
assistance in crisis management, etc. All these functions are described in the 
annual reports on Danish Defence (e.g. Defence Command Denmark, 2012). In 
conjunction with the 2004 Agreement, experience from the Balkan missions of 
the 1990s led to the announcement of a new major formal component of Danish 
security and foreign policy. Beyond the Agreement itself, a letter signed by the 
ministers of foreign affairs and defence announced a new framework for civil-
military cooperation in these international missions (MOD, 2004). In the letter, 
the Danish word for comprehensive approach is ‘civil-militær samtænkning’ or 
literally ‘civil-military coordinated thinking’. While the letter signalled a new 
ambition for cooperation in this area it also described the continuity of a clear 
demarcation of authority between the ministries. The 2004 Agreement also 
instituted an inter-ministerial coordination body with representatives from 
relevant ministries. As a consequence of the new Danish policy, Denmark also 
promoted the idea inside NATO as ‘Comprehensive Planning and Action’, which 
was later to become the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (Fischer & Top Christensen, 
2005).   
‘Samtænkning’, however, as it was to become in daily parlance, has had 
an ambiguous use and meaning in Danish foreign and security policy ever since. 
The concept, in losing the ‘civil-military’ part has also doubled as a Danish version 
of ‘whole-of-government’ in general terms. In consequence, some confusion and 
suspicion has been attributed to the concept by various actors inside and, 
particularly in the case of the NGO’s (which play an especially important role in 
Danish development policy), outside the government hierarchy.  
Second, ‘samtænkning’, by virtue of its reference to the civilian and 
coordinating side of an equation sometimes dominated by military concerns, also 
became the glue which tied together the increasingly elaborate strategic political 
frameworks for Danish contributions, especially in Afghanistan (MFA and MOD, 
2008; MFA and MOD, 2013). The history and functions of the concept are 
therefore more than operational and practical, and often political in the deep 
sense that its very ambiguity has been an important element in creating and 
sustaining broad political agreement to Danish foreign policy in these areas. A 
substantial role for ‘samtænkning’ in strategic guidance documents became a 
route for the left in Parliament (and the opposition) to agree to Danish policy.  
In practical terms, the Danish WGA to international civil-military 
stabilisation missions has been developed on a case by case basis. The model 
developed from a very limited degree of cooperation between the embassy in 
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Bagdad and the Danish military contingent in Basra in the early phases of the 
occupation of Iraq. The lack of direct connection and support prompted the 
comprehensive approach letter in 2004.  
Toward the end of the Danish efforts in Iraq, public debate about the lack 
of continuous monitoring and prioritisation (based on access to end-of-tour 
reports) led to pressure to increase the level of attention paid in Copenhagen. 
For the subsequent Afghanistan mission, this meant that from 2008 onward the 
political parties to the agreements in Parliament together with the government 
ministers and in coordination with international partners in Regional Command 
South, developed a set of strategic steering documents covering both Danish 
civilian and military contributions, . In spite of the steep learning curve in Iraq 
and later in Helmand, there was little formal change to the CA setup in 
Copenhagen, even if an Afghanistan task force was set up inside the MFA.  
In 2009, concurrently with a critical evaluation of Danish CA efforts in 
Afghanistan (Stepputat, 2009; Schmidt, 2009) a stabilization secretariat was 
established inside the MFA. This small (and perpetually understaffed) unit is 
manned by the MFA (in principle 3-4 people) and the MOD (in principle 1-2, but 
in reality less). From the outset, the secretariat has been tasked with developing 
policy on fragile states and stabilisation, managing the daily running of the Peace 
and Stabilisation Fund, following operations, strengthening civil capacities for 
stabilisation, and gathering and processing lessons learned from this rather 
broad area.  
Following international best practice, the Danish Peace and Stabilisation 
Fund (FSF) was founded in 2010 to fund efforts that fall partially outside military 
operations and Official Development Assistance (ODA) according to the OECD 
DAC criteria. To date it has funded three geographically motivated frameworks in 
Afghanistan-Pakistan, in the Horn of Africa and Maghreb-Sahel.  
 In 2010, a new coordination body manned by heads of department from 
the MOD, Defence Command, the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of 
Justice was formed to provide the leadership function for the stabilisation 
secretariat. This new ‘comprehensive approach steering group’ meets about 
once every month and is formally tasked with being the Danish forum for 
strategic and operational decisions regarding politically established 
frameworks for civil-military and stabilisation missions. The steering group also 
has the authority to oversee the management of the FSF.  In 2010, moreover, the 
MFA published a Danish policy toward fragile states emphasising the ‘integration 
of activities ensuring a clear cohesion between Danish Foreign and security 
policy in relation to fragile states’ (MOD, 2010, ii). 
Denmark’s armed forces do not formally make independent doctrine as 
the country relies on NATO doctrine, but do make use of TTP (tactics, techniques 
and procedures) that are not publicly available. There are no plans to develop 
interagency doctrine, but some shared training and mission preparation includes 
civilians, and military training exercises often contain stabilisation elements.  
In practice, many of the civilians employed in CA-related positions in 
Helmand have a reserve officer background and are thus able to liaise easily 
with the military component. However, military and CA operational and 
strategic learning have been hampered by a lack formal systems and a low 
  
Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence | ICDS Report  
 
24 
 
degree of strategic reflection (Søby & Salling Larsen, 2010). Regarding military 
capability planning, CA issues do not seem to affect prioritisation except that 
materiel for international operations has either been acquired to serve directly in 
stabilisation missions (such as Mine Resistant Vehicles for Afghanistan) or is 
required to be multifunctional as future mission preparedness must include the 
full spectrum of operations.  
In 2013, Denmark published a new policy for stabilisation in fragile 
states, bringing renewed attention to ‘upstream’ conflict prevention rather than 
‘downstream’ post-conflict stabilisation. The new policy document emphasises 
the continued utility of CA and WGA and is the conceptual framework for the FSF 
(Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice, 2013). 
 II.1.3 Internal challenges and initiatives 
In Denmark, domestic security related policies have in the period since 
the 9/11 attacks in the United States been dominated by means to respond to to 
international terrorism and new risks and threats such as those related to cyber 
security and other critical infrastructure. In this domain too, the new challenges 
have presented difficulties to the existing administrative division of labour, 
resulting in lengthy decision-making processes concerning certain reforms and 
unsettled issues regarding others.  
After the Cold War, the Danish approach to emergency management was 
reformed as the civil defence organisation and the municipal fire departments 
were merged under one single catastrophe preparedness organisation, 
administrated by the Ministry of the Interior. Following the renewed focus on 
man-made catastrophes after 9/11, the government decided to move the Danish 
Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) under the purview of the MOD in 2004 
(MOD, 2004b).  
Continuous reforms since the Cold War have meant that the domestic 
operative structure of Danish emergency management now resides at the 
municipal level, supported by five national-level centres. In keeping with both 
the historical local roots of disaster response and the international standard all-
hazards approach, Danish emergency management policy has traditionally been 
organised around a principle of ‘sector responsibility’. This principle emphasises 
that higher-level organisations such as DEMA primarily help develop the general 
framework for preparedness plans, whereas concrete plans are developed and 
implemented at the local level (municipalities) there. This entails risk profiling 
and establishing a concomitant level of service. Following international trends, 
this approach was complemented by a national vulnerability analysis in 2005 
with subsequent annual updates. In the same vein, the EU increasingly requires 
national-level reporting on, for example, (European) critical infrastructure. 
Conceptually, this introduces the idea of a new internal security policy 
prioritisation and potentially challenges the sector responsibility principle 
(Breitenbauch, 2012). 
In a foreshadowing of the current WSA, Danish civil defence and 
emergency management had involved the private sector through the sector 
responsibility principle already during the Cold War. The ‘Private Sector Home 
Guard’ covers three sectors of ‘societal importance’, namely energy, 
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communication and transport. It is a framework in which public and private 
companies are connected to the Home Guard and emergency management 
structure through cooperation on planning and education (Home Guard, 2013). 
In the same way, the fire service and the large role played by the Home Guard 
especially in maritime responsiveness is to some extent based on voluntary or 
semi-voluntary work.  
In emergency management policy, the shift of DEMA to the MOD has 
meant that the resources of DEMA are increasingly being leveraged in an 
international context as one tool among others in the activist foreign policy tool 
box. Support to international disaster response often happens through 
multilateral cooperation institutions like the EU and NATO, necessitating 
planning and training for international interoperability. At the same time, Danish 
defence has examined ways in which defence assets can be used in international 
disaster response (just as they are in domestic situations), thus pointing to a 
general emphasis on employing state capabilities in a WGA to foreign policy in 
a broad sense. Moving DEMA under the purview of the MOD appears to have 
enhanced this connection in both directions, even if the underlying 
organisational cultures have not shifted much towards each other.  
In addition to this, cross-cutting issues such as cyber security have 
proven to be difficult to resolve without further coordination among political 
actors. It took more than seven years to establish the Danish computer 
emergency response team (GovCert), which was founded in 2009 as part of the 
MOD to replace the former complex network of cooperation among a host of 
agencies (the predecessor, DK Cert, grew from research and education network 
protection and was located under the Ministry of Education). The slow 
implementation of Danish GovCert is an example of the relatively low degree of 
effectiveness of whole-of-government efforts in Danish central administration. 
Moreover, the location of GovCert under the MOD, in spite of the relatively 
limited military role in cyber security, emphasises the ambiguities of Danish 
security policy in the post-9/11 world. 
A final example, beyond the MOD sphere but still related to ‘hard’ 
security issues concerns the challenge of international terrorism and the link 
between domestic groups and individuals, and the larger scenes abroad. Danish 
FSF whole-of-government approaches to stabilisation in e.g. Eastern Africa 
include anti-radicalisation programmes, and the Danish Police’s Security and 
Intelligence Service (PET) has partnered with Kenyan authorities (Danish Security 
and Intelligence Service, 2012).  
The transnational character of the threat has meant a new international 
role for PET, a role which is then also a building block in the formal whole-of-
government framework. These new possibilities and tasks for PET, including 
efforts abroad, have been accompanied by a substantially larger budget. In 2007, 
the Centre for Terror Analysis was founded at PET including a small regular PET 
staff and ‘up to 15’ rotating representatives from the Defence Intelligence 
Service, MFA, PET and DEMA (Danish Security and Intelligence Service, 2013). 
The new tasks have at the same time raised some questions of principle about 
oversight and parliamentary control which are as of yet unsettled. The political 
appetite to address this continuously worrying issue has so far appeared to be 
stronger than the interest in transparency – as illustrated by the controversy 
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surrounding the recent case of a former intelligence asset who was instrumental 
in providing the United States with targeting information on Anwar Al-Awlaki in 
Yemen. 
 II.1.4 The potential cost of flexibility 
The new array of security-related tasks since the turn of the millennium 
ranges from post-conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention to domestic critical 
infrastructure, including the organisation of cyber security and the issue of 
dealing with terrorism in networks that cut across the domestic-international 
divide. The traditional division of labour in the Danish central administration has 
been challenged to respond quickly and effectively in this context, especially to 
such issues that cut across the normal areas of ministerial competence. 
Generally speaking, change has been slow and shallow. Mostly, this can be 
explained by the bureaucratic culture of the Danish central administration. 
Relying on the principles of flexibility and informality, the traditional culture has 
promoted effective administration inside ministerial organisations. But these 
same virtues have fared less well when challenged to deliver effective 
coordination across organisations, exactly because of the lower degree of 
formalisation preferred, which includes a reticence to establish new, and 
especially cross-cutting institutional structures.  
The transformation of the new challenges -- such as stabilisation 
operations or cyber security -- into effective institutionalised tasks and processes 
also seems to be harder to bring about because there is a relatively low degree 
of formal learning within the system. Permanent or long-lived inter-ministerial 
committees are little used in Denmark, perhaps also because of the small size of 
the administration. The trend is for ministries to prefer to keep decision-making 
structures in-house, especially in the case of the MFA. The MFA guards its 
monopoly on the right to lead/coordinate all Danish external relations with great 
vigour. As it is itself a relatively large organisation, the most important turf wars 
take place inside the MFA rather than between ministries.  
One exception is the slightly changed role of the Prime Minister’s (PM) 
cabinet, which since the millennium and depending on the personality of the PM 
and on the subject, has taken more of a lead in foreign policy subjects. The 
MFA’s formal lead is challenged now and then when policy subjects appear that 
are not evidently entirely within its purview, such as the preparations for the 
2009 UN environmental summit (COP 15), where both the PM’s cabinet as well 
as the Ministry of the Environment played a large part. In spite of this, the PM’s 
cabinet has not moved forward substantially toward a role of actively 
coordinating these new cross-cutting challenges - e.g. in a national security 
strategy (Breitenbauch 2008).  
In sum, a set of mechanisms has been established which has furthered 
the ability of the Danish government to monitor, implement and plan whole-
of-government policies. As a result, Danish government efforts to address the 
new cross-cutting challenges have been improved over the period in question. 
Appraising this situation from a positive point of view, the instinct to prefer 
existing arrangements and eschew new bureaucratic tasks and structures can, of 
course, also be interpreted as a sign of frugality and as a preference for the 
cost-effective solutions that can be found in the existing structures and 
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processes. The changes that have been instituted as part of the reaction to the 
challenges have been rather slow in coming, however. And when they have 
come, a critical look would sometimes assess them as superficial, such as in the 
case of the understaffed stabilisation secretariat.  
The Danish central administration and its agencies have been pressed to 
identify and implement effective processes and institutionalised approaches to 
comprehensive approach and whole-of-government mechanisms both at home 
and abroad. As a consequence of the relatively weak institutional response to 
cross-cutting challenges that require extensive coordination, this is still a weak 
spot for the Danish government. Apparently too small to establish formalised 
cross-cutting coordination and implementation, but big enough to be stove-
piped, the changes implemented in Danish central administration appear to be 
relatively minor. This points to a need for continued attention to the strengths 
and weaknesses related not only to the formal institutionalised approaches, but 
also to the role that the bureaucratic cultural preference for flexibility and 
informality plays with regard to inter-ministerial coordination and cooperation in 
Denmark. The 2013 stabilisation policy document is one example of a forward-
looking attempt to keep forging a unity of perspective and action across all 
Danish actors, demonstrating the continued salience of the issue. 
 II.2 Finland4 
 II.2.1 Background 
Collaboration between different government and other actors to 
guarantee the security of the country has long roots in Finnish history. The 
Second World War was not only about fighting against the enemy in trenches, 
but also about marshalling the totality of a small country’s resources and 
focusing them on the survival of the nation. This tradition has been carried on, 
providing the basis even in Finland today of how to prepare for and manage 
crises facing Finnish society. 
For a long time, the emphasis was on how to best use society’s capabilities 
to improve and support Finnish military defence. Reflecting this, the committee 
established to identify, coordinate and use all society’s resources to this end was 
called the Security and Defence Committee. Appropriately, the Committee 
secretariat was located in the Ministry of Defence.  
It was only in the 1990s that a new approach began to emerge.  The special 
needs of military defence continued to be recognised, but it was also understood 
that a myriad other challenges and threats are more relevant than the threat of 
war in people’s everyday lives.  Cross-border threats such as terrorism, organised 
crime, trafficking in drugs and humans, infectious diseases, environmental 
threats, disruptions in energy supply and, last but by no means least, cyber-
attacks threaten to disrupt the daily lives of the citizens, and have to be 
countered and their effects mitigated. Often these global threats are 
multidimensional and interconnected, and require the use of a wide range of 
instruments.  
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 II.2.2 Key concepts 
The new approach was evident in the Government Resolutions of 2003 
and 2006 on Securing the Functions Vital to Society, as well as in the 2009 
Finnish Security and Defence Policy Report (‘Defence White Book’), where the 
principles, objectives and implementation criteria for Finland’s security and 
defence policy were outlined. The Government Resolution of 2010 (‘Security 
Strategy for Society’) and the 2012 Defence White Book further elaborate the 
new comprehensive approach. It is still further refined in the 2012 Government 
Resolution on Comprehensive Security and the 2013 Government Resolution on 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. 
In Finland, the critical objectives of ‘comprehensive security’ are defined 
as follows: ‘The most important tasks of Finland’s foreign, security and defence 
policy are to safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity and basic values; 
to promote the population’s security and well-being; and to maintain the 
functioning of society’ (Finnish MOD, 2010). The measures taken under the 
principle of comprehensive security aim to secure the vital functions of society 
in a cooperative effort in which the state and municipal authorities, non-
governmental organisations and business community collaborate with each 
other. The aim is to secure the functions vital to society under all conditions, and 
the main principle is that security in society builds on the arrangements made 
under normal conditions.   
A Government resolution from the year 2010, ‘Security Strategy for 
Society’, provides guidelines to all ministries, to regional and local 
administrations, and to the rest of the society, for achieving these goals. The 
Strategy is based on ‘a comprehensive concept of security’ and covers the 
preparedness of society and crisis management under both normal and 
emergency situations. It provides guidelines to the authorities in public 
administration, the business community and non-governmental organisations, 
and harmonises their preparedness planning. Ministries are responsible for the 
overall preparedness in their administrative sectors, as well as for overseeing the 
related research, guidance of activities and legislative measures on the basis of 
the Strategy. 
The Strategy aims to provide guidelines for ‘safeguarding functions that are 
vital to society in all situations’ (Finnish MOD, 2010: 3). Such functions, according 
to the Strategy, are the following (ibid, 16): 
- Maintenance of State functions, 
- Maintenance of international activities, 
- Safeguarding of defence capability, 
- Maintaining internal security, 
- Securing the functioning of the economy and the vital infrastructure, 
- Safeguarding the population’s daily needs and capability to function, and 
- Supporting the population’s psychological resilience to crises. 
 II.2.3 Threat scenarios 
In the Strategy, threat scenarios are divided into ‘threats’ and 
‘disturbances’ (ibid, 13-15). Disturbances refer to a threat or an incident which 
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endangers, at least momentarily or in a regionally limited way, the security or 
functioning of society or the livelihood of the population. Disturbances may 
occur both in normal conditions and in emergency situations. The systems and 
preparedness measures built for normal conditions provide the basis for actions 
taken in emergency conditions. Conversely, the systems created for emergency 
conditions must be available to manage disturbances under normal 
circumstances. 
The threat scenarios used in the Strategy for securing the functions vital to 
society are the following: 
- Serious disturbances in power supply, 
- Serious disturbances in telecommunications and information systems ( 
e.g. cyber threats), 
- Serious disturbances in transportation and logistics, 
- Serious disturbances in public utilities, 
- Serious disturbances in food supply, 
- Serious disturbances in financial and payment systems, 
- Disruptions in the availability of public funding, 
- Serious disturbances in the health and welfare of the population, 
- Major accidents, extreme natural phenomena and environmental threats, 
- Terrorism and other criminality that endangers social order, 
- Serious disturbances in border security, 
- Political, economic and military pressure, and 
- The use of military force against Finland. 
 II.2.4 The main actors and their responsibilities 
In Finland, comprehensive security has been developed in concert with 
the authorities, the business community and non-governmental organisations. 
Cooperation between these different levels of actors has provided a baseline for 
contingency planning, the division of roles and responsibilities and the practical 
measures for implementing policies. 
The President of the Republic heads Finland’s foreign policy in cooperation 
with the Government. For countering emergencies, the Government is 
responsible for national preparations and may be authorised to use the 
additional emergency powers provided in the Emergency Powers Act. This is 
subject to a parliamentary decision. According to the Emergency Powers Act, the 
Government would introduce the statute on implementing the Emergency 
Powers Act after having concluded with the President that the country faces 
emergency conditions. The final decision, however, is in the hands of the 
Parliament. 
The Government directs, supervises and coordinates the securing of 
functions vital to society. Each ministry does the same within its respective 
administrative sector in its role as the ‘competent’ ministry. The joint meeting of 
the President and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
discusses important aspects of foreign and security policy, included salient issues 
concerning Finland’s military defence and comprehensive security. The ministries 
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cooperate with each other as necessary, under the leadership of the competent 
ministry. 
The Permanent Secretaries in each ministry have the task of directing and 
supervising the activities of their respective ministries. Each ministry nominates a 
Head of Preparedness, who assists the Permanent Secretary in the 
implementation of preparedness tasks. The Meeting of Permanent Secretaries 
and the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness are permanent cooperation bodies, 
in which preparedness issues and their coordination are discussed and handled. 
Heads of Preparedness are assisted in their tasks by Preparedness Secretaries, 
nominated in each ministry. 
Two ministries have a special position in this system. The Ministry of 
Defence is responsible for coordinating all comprehensive security activities. 
This involves synchronising such activities in the public sector (government, 
state authorities and the municipalities), in the business sector, and in the 
voluntary sphere (i.e. activities by Finnish citizens through non-governmental 
organisations) in order to maintain the functions vital to society under all 
circumstances. The Security Committee (before February 2013, the Security and 
Defence Committee) assists the Ministry of Defence in these tasks. The 
Committee is historically part of the Ministry of Defence structure, but it serves 
the government and all the ministries in preparing, coordinating and 
implementing comprehensive security measures. 
The other ministry with an overarching general task in the field of 
comprehensive security is the Ministry of Finance. It is responsible for the 
general guidance and development of common information systems and 
networks in Finland. It is also responsible for the general guidance and directing 
of information society and ICT preparedness in the public sector. 
Various levels of regional administration also have roles in comprehensive 
security activities. Regional administration was reorganised in 2010, when the 
Regional State Administrative Agencies (RSAA) and the Centres for Economic 
Development, Transport and the Environment (CEDTE) were established. The 
former are responsible for coordinating preparedness in the regions, 
coordinating preparedness planning, supporting preparedness planning in the 
municipalities, and organising preparedness exercises in the regions. Regional 
preparedness committees were established for these purposes. The CEDTE are 
responsible for implementing and developing preparedness and crisis 
management measures in their areas in connection with the environment and 
natural resources, traffic and infrastructure, business activities including 
agriculture, the use of the workforce, immigration, education and culture. 
One further level of preparedness planning takes place in the 
municipalities, where the responsibility for organising basic services and other 
functions vital to society lies. The obligation of the municipalities to prepare for 
emergency conditions comes from the Emergency Powers Act. Furthermore, the 
business community is an essential partner in the municipalities in preparing to 
protect the vital functions of society through effective cooperation. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for 
developing security of supply. The Finnish organisation for security of supply 
consists of the National Emergency Supply Agency, which is a public body 
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subordinate to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Council for 
Security of Supply and Infrastructure, and the security of supply sectors and 
pools, which act as permanent co-operation bodies.  
The National Emergency Supply Agency is responsible for the tasks related 
to the coordination, development, and maintenance of security of supply. Its 
instruments include the emergency stockpiling of critical products, legislation on 
preparedness and financial and economic policy, and the voluntary participation 
of critically important companies and organisations.  This sort of preparedness 
planning is a good example of successful voluntary public-private partnerships. 
Last but not least, there are myriad non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that have their vital role in providing everyday security and in improving 
individual citizens’ crisis resilience. Such organisations include voluntary fire 
brigades, local Red Cross organisations, farmers’ associations, and sports clubs, 
just to name a few. By supporting the government authorities, they play an 
important role in, for example, search and rescue, civil defence and fire-fighting, 
voluntary military defence, first aid and psychological support functions. They 
are also a significant actor in providing early humanitarian aid to crisis areas, at 
home and abroad.  
 II.2.5 The key role of the Security Committee 
The task of the Security Committee, still located in the Ministry of 
Defence, is to assist the Government and various ministries in matters pertaining 
to comprehensive security. It also coordinates preparedness issues related to 
comprehensive security. In case of disturbances or emergencies, the Committee 
will act as a specialist body. The Committee is a non-permanent body of 
government officials and experts, nominated by their ministries or agencies. It 
meets regularly, usually once a month, to deal with issues within its competence.  
In its present form, the Committee started its work on February 1, 2013, when it 
replaced its predecessor, the Security and Defence Committee. It has 19 
members and 3 permanent experts. Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy, produced 
under the auspices of the Committee in 2013, is a good example of its work. 
The Committee is chaired by the Permanent Secretary for Defence, the 
highest non-political official at the Ministry of Defence. The Deputy Chairman is 
the State Secretary from the Prime Minister’s Office. There are members, all at 
the level of Permanent Secretary or equivalent, from the: Office of the President, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Employment 
and Economy, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, and Ministry of the 
Environment. In addition, the Committee includes the Director General from the 
Ministry of the Interior, the National Police Commissioner, the Chief of Defence 
Staff from the Defence Forces, the Chief of the Border Guards, the Director 
General from the Customs Authority, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
National Emergency Supply Agency. The three expert members of the 
Committee are the State Secretary for EU Affairs from the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the Director of Government Communications also from the Prime 
Minister’s Office, and the Chairman of the National Emergency Supply 
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Council.The Security Committee is provided with a small secretariat: currently 13 
officials, 6 of them permanent and 7 part-time. 
 II.2.6 Other issues 
In the last few years, much attention has also been paid in Finland to the 
issue of cyber security. Finland is one of the most advanced countries in the 
world in terms of information technology applications in society. Yet, it came as a 
shock in early November 2013 when the penetration of the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs reporting system by foreign spies over the last four years became 
publicly known. One of the many results of this attack will be that the legislation 
that was already in preparation will be speeded and strengthened. Also, the 
implementation of concrete counter-measures will be accelerated. 
The present system of comprehensive security is tested every four years 
in a country-wide exercise called VALHA (‘valtionhallinto’, or state 
administration).  The latest exercise, VALHA-13, was carried out in 2013. 
There is some debate on where the Security Committee should be located. 
For historical reasons it has always been part of the Ministry of Defence, but 
some would like to see it located in the Prime Minister’s Office. At least for the 
remainder of the current Government’s term in power - until the next 
parliamentary elections in 2015 - the Security Committee will continue to 
operate from its present office in the Ministry of Defence. 
 II.3 The Netherlands5 
The security policies of the Netherlands place a strong emphasis on 
comprehensive solutions to external and internal security challenges. The 
coordinated deployment of instruments available to the government that are 
relevant to the particular circumstances – the integrated approach -- is a well-
established principle. This section reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Dutch approach in bringing together various security stakeholders. 
 II.3.1 Policy framework – not so integrated? 
Despite the continuous rise of the importance of the integrated approach 
in Dutch security thinking, its policy framework remains, by and large, split 
between external and internal vectors. Externally, the Netherlands directs its 
actions on the basis of its International Security Strategy (ISS), which formulates 
the Dutch view of the external security environment, establishes the 
Netherlands’ strategic interests in the world and defines the main areas of policy 
focus. The process of formulating the ISS is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Internal security is governed on the basis of the National Security Strategy (NSS), 
which lays out the process for assessing internal security risks and threats, 
defines vital interests in this realm, establishes principles for securing those 
interests and develops key themes that require action. This process was initially 
led by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, but after government 
restructuring was taken over by the Ministry of Security and Justice. In addition, 
there are policy documents covering either a particular area of institutional 
responsibility (e.g. the Defence White Paper) or a domain which cuts across 
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many areas of institutional responsibilities (e.g. the National Cyber Security 
Strategy). They are all approved by the Netherlands’ Cabinet. 
The absence of an overarching security strategy, combining and 
integrating both external and internal vectors, is somewhat discordant with the 
Dutch emphasis on integrated approaches. In fact, the current NSS was drafted 
with a view that it would include both external and internal security aspects. 
However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs eventually opted to stay out of this 
process and to continue with the ISS as a separate framework, probably and 
indication of the MFA’s wish to protect its lead in external relations. Recently, 
the Government resolved that the two security policy vectors should be brought 
under a single overarching document, but the latest iteration of the ISS (‘A 
Secure Netherlands in A Secure World’) was published in 2013 as the usual 
stand-alone document. 
In spite of this, the Dutch security policy expert interviewed for this 
report saw a degree of convergence and similarities between the ISS and NSS, 
as the interests outlined in both overlap (e.g. economic security features in both 
documents; internal social and political stability in the NSS echoes the 
international legal order in the ISS; defence of national and allied territory in the 
ISS reflects territorial security as a vital interest in the NSS). Issues and 
opportunities flowing from membership of the EU also cut across both strategies, 
raising further questions as to whether the separation of internally and 
externally oriented security policy frameworks is reasonable. There is some 
feeling in the Netherlands that this will have to be changed, although the change 
will be slow due to the habits of the ministries and departments, which are eager 
to protect their turf. 
 II.3.2 Integrated approach as a key concept of Dutch security policy 
Despite the separation of the internal and external security policies, both 
the ISS and NSS place a strong emphasis on integrating various tools of national 
power to manage contemporary security challenges; indeed, one of the policy 
focus areas of the ISS is titled ‘integrated approach’. According to the document, 
‘Recent experiences in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo and Libya have shown 
that intervention is effective only if the instruments of defence, diplomacy, 
development cooperation, the police, the justice system and trade are deployed 
in a coordinated fashion’ (The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013:16).  
It further notes that, ‘An integrated approach also allows better coordination of 
the activities of Dutch military personnel, police officers, lawyers, businesses, 
civil society organisations, civilian experts and diplomats in conflict zones’ (Ibid). 
In some specific areas such as cyber security, energy, resource availability and 
counterpiracy, the ISS policy focus is set on engaging the private sector as a 
critical stakeholder in security. 
Similarly, the NSS also calls for a joined-up, integrated and coherent 
approach to national security. It states that: 
Naturally governments and private parties are already active in strengthening 
security. In order to be able to effectively direct these efforts, now than ever 
cooperation is needed between all organisations that are responsible for 
national security: national government, local authorities, social organisations 
and the business community. An approach that guarantees integrity and 
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coherence across security sectors is essential. (The Netherlands Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007: 12) 
Just as the ISS, the NSS also points out that the private sector has very 
important responsibilities in safeguarding society’s critical functions in crisis 
circumstances and in responding to threats. This particularly pertains to 
information and communication, energy and other critical infrastructure (NSS, 
2007:32). 
This framework lays the ground for practical steps to develop 
methodologies, processes and mechanisms aimed at integrating various 
instruments, even though it is acknowledged that the precise mix of instruments 
and their application will always vary depending on circumstances. 
 II.3.3 Implementation mechanisms 
In implementing the integrated approach, both the ISS and NSS stress the 
importance of mutual awareness, and joint threat assessments, analysis, 
planning and learning mechanisms. For instance, the ISS (The Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013: 17) states, when describing its policy focus on 
an integrated approach: 
Collaboration begins in The Hague. Government ministries coordinate their 
activities among themselves and with external actors such as civil society 
organisations. An integrated approach to planning is also needed. Joint analysis 
involving all relevant ministries and organisations is an important first step in the 
process. Once the decision has been taken to provide a contribution, it is vital to 
establish the baseline situation. Any plan for transferring responsibility to the 
local (and, where necessary, the international) community must be based on 
analysis and measurement. Finally, a thorough joint evaluation allows lessons to 
be learned and put into practice, as happened after the missions in Uruzgan and 
Kunduz. 
The NSS (The Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 
2007: 10) likewise states that, ‘in order to enable an integral approach, all parties 
involved must know and respect each other’s role in strengthening national 
security, follow a shared doctrine, align their working methods to each other and 
be connected to the same communication network.’ This is reflected in the four 
principles of authority and control laid out in the strategy: clear role division 
and role consistency; unité de doctrine; alignment of working methods 
(including decision-making processes, communication strategies, synchronisation 
of planning and regular joint exercises and training); and a uniform information 
network (Ibid, 31-32). 
The ISS statement has been informed by Dutch experience in operations, 
particularly in Afghanistan. Indeed, the pressure for the capital to become more 
systematic, coherent and comprehensive in its policies and practices grew from 
the bottom, from the Dutch-led task forces on the ground in Afghanistan. 
Initially, a Collaborative Decision-Making (CDM) model, which aimed to involve 
all relevant actors in the area of operations and tie them together in a coherent 
manner in all relevant dimensions (political, social, economic and security), was 
drawn for the task force in Uruzgan (see Spoelstra et al, 2010). After a few years, 
a more elaborate and updated version of the model was applied to campaign 
planning in Kunduz (van Bemmel & Eikelboom, 2010). This is now being turned 
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into an even more comprehensive generic model, which would be applied by the 
government in The Hague to plan all operations abroad. 
In the process of developing this model, significant differences between 
the military and civilian approaches to mission planning had to be bridged. 
According to one interviewed expert, the military usually envisage a desired end-
state and draw a number of courses of action to achieve it; civilian organisations, 
particularly diplomats, usually envisage a range of acceptable outcomes and 
navigate towards them within a certain bandwidth which constrains freedom of 
action. The CDM has proved that the two approaches can be reconciled through 
systematic and evidence-based development work, and can be successfully 
applied in operations. 
Although the CDM model has yet to be elevated from the tactical and 
operational levels to the strategic-political level, several institutional 
arrangements are already in place to promote the WGA in operations outside the 
Netherlands. For instance, the MFA has a coordinator for security issues and 
comprehensive approach in its Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department. 
At the political level, there are steering groups on military operations and 
civilian missions, which bring together senior defence, foreign affairs, finance, 
economy and justice officials (Wittkowsky & Wittkampf, 2013:2). Some 
interviewed experts, however, believe that the discussions in these formats are 
too tactical and operational, seldom touching upon more fundamental strategic 
issues.  
There are currently no guidelines for an integrated approach or doctrine 
for inter-agency training to support involvement in international operations, 
although some exercises address issues of collaborative decision-making and 
inter-agency interactions. However, according to one interviewed expert, 
operational experiences in Kunduz led the Dutch police and military police, who 
had to collaborate a lot in the area of operations, to conduct more joint exercises 
and to seek to align their doctrines. It is quite likely that, once the CDM model 
has spread and become established practice, a doctrine or a set of guidelines for 
the whole-of-government integrated approach towards international conflicts 
will eventually be formulated. 
The NSS outlines the main building blocks for whole-of-government 
activities. These include, as stage one, government-wide analysis, i.e. strategic 
foresight, thematic in-depth studies and scenarios, short-term horizon scanning 
and national risk assessment. In stage two, strategic planning is conducted, 
where planning assumptions are made, the assessment of the capabilities 
required to meet the identified threats is undertaken, and where matching of 
those requirements against existing capabilities is performed. In the final stage, 
or follow-up, various policies, legislation and measures are enacted to 
implement the strategic plans (NSS, 2007: 21). 
There are also institutional mechanisms to support the implementation 
of the NSS. For instance, nine ministries cooperate in implementing an integrated 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) programme, which is also closely linked 
with the inter-agency Threats and Capacities (T&P) programme, responsible for 
national risk assessments as well as capacity building. In this, the ministries are 
supported by the informal Strategic Council for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
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(SOVI), which is a public-private partnership of CIP stakeholders. Knowledge and 
information exchange, networking and advice are provided by the National 
Advisory Centre for the Critical Infrastructure (NAVI). There are similar 
arrangements (‘issue based units’) in other fields to facilitate the integration of 
various internal security stakeholders and their coherent actions, including the 
National Crisis Centre (NCC) responsible for national crisis response; the 
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb); and, most recently, the 
National Cyber Security Centre in the area of responsibility of the Ministry of 
Justice and Security. 
The civil-military dimension is an important constituent of the Dutch 
integrated approach. Ten years ago, the Netherlands Armed Forces were 
declared a strategic partner of the civilian security organisations. This is in line 
with core missions, which encompass territorial defence (e.g. against terrorist 
attack) and assistance to civil authorities in the event of emergencies and during 
crises. A catalogue of military capabilities available for managing civil 
contingencies was developed by the armed forces and included such capabilities 
as CBRN, EOD, engineering, transportation and medical capabilities, naval 
vessels, radars, and UAVs. Some joint civil-military training facilities (e.g. in 
CBRN) were also set up (The Netherlands Ministry of Defence & The Netherlands 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007). 
Domestically, however, the integrated approach, suffers from a number of 
shortcomings, which will take time to address. According to the interviews, chief 
among these are: 
 Although national risk assessment (the first phase of the NSS process) is 
methodologically one of the most sophisticated and elaborate among 
such processes in the world, the strategic planning phase is rather weak. 
Organisations seldom conduct generic planning of capabilities together or 
include one another’s needs in their own planning considerations. 
 The civil security sector at the local, regional and national levels is 
rather fragmented, making it difficult for the defence organisation to 
deal with a broad variety of stakeholders who often have conflicting 
requirements. An on-going process of centralisation in managing some of 
the civil security functions might help to rectify this in the future. 
 Awareness of the capabilities of the civil security sector is limited on the 
defence side. There is no corresponding catalogue of civilian capabilities 
available to the defence organisation. 
 The defence organisation is still too insular, and does not see itself as an 
integral part of the internal security apparatus. With its primary focus on 
expeditionary operations, it is less enthusiastic about its internal security 
functions. 
 Crisis management structures are still too stove-piped, meaning that the 
civil-military interface is not as responsive as it could be and can be 
hampered by multi-layered and stove-piped lines of communications 
between the authorities at different levels (e.g. for a request to go from a 
mayor to a local military unit commander, it has to go up the civilian 
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chain of governance and then, having passed from the civilian to the 
military system, return down the military chain of command). 
 Various civil-military exercises demonstrate persistent problems with 
coordination, interoperability, doctrinal void or disharmony and too 
divergent processes. This indicates that the goal of the NSS to achieve 
more integration is still some way off. 
 II.3.4 Cultural aspects 
One of the key features of the Dutch culture of political and governance is 
the so-called Polder Model, ‘which favours consensus and cooperation 
irrespective of individual rank’, and which ‘builds on pragmatic trial and error 
processes’ (Wittkowsky & Wittkampf, 2013:2). This culture quite strongly 
underpins the institutional and personal interactions between security and 
defence stakeholders (public and private), although examples of some ministries 
still going ahead with separate strategies or the challenges of civil-military 
interaction demonstrate that it has its limits. Nonetheless, the bottom-up 
emergence of the CDM model serves as an illustration of how integrated 
approaches can be advanced through trial, experimentation and error as well as 
through a cooperative attitude of the involved stakeholders. 
The consensual and democratic nature of Dutch political and governance 
culture is also averse to dominant institutional or personal actors in decision-
making. This, according to one interviewed expert, may explain why the 
Netherlands lacks a powerful Prime Minister’s office which could act as a strong 
and active integrator of various strategies, policies and planning processes. Such 
a role for the PM’s office may nonetheless emerge in the future, under the 
continuous pressure of cross-cutting security issues and operational challenges. 
It will, however, be a slow process and will have to take into account the 
diversity of security stakeholders, and upon the consensual culture of the Polder 
Model. 
 II.4 Sweden6 
 II.4.1 Background 
During the Cold War, Sweden employed a total defence concept which 
had the purpose of defending the nation against an armed attack. The concept 
aimed to coordinate the activities of all relevant government authorities to 
support the armed forces. In the early 1990s a vast number of agencies tasked to 
coordinate activities in the field of civil defence, psychological defence, self-
sufficiency and ensuring the vital functions of Swedish society remained. The 
extent of these activities can be gleaned by recalling that Sweden had decided to 
remain non-aligned in peace time with the aim of being neutral in times of war. 
Thus there was no possibility to rely on allies – Sweden would depend entirely on 
its own resources. 
In the mid-1990s it became obvious that the Cold War was over and that 
the military threat was gradually disappearing. A major threat and risk 
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assessment study was launched by the Government, following which focus 
shifted from countering military threats to planning for civil emergencies, which 
had so far seen only limited attention. Previously it had been assumed that if the 
civil authorities were able to mount a credible civil defence system to support 
the armed forces, they would also be effective in the case of emergencies, crises 
and disasters. All contingency planning was cancelled and so were most crisis 
management exercises. Some organisations were merged, others were replaced 
by newly established structures of which a couple were disbanded after only a 
few years (Werger, 2013).  
The 2004 tsunami in Thailand, where 543 Swedish citizens lost their lives 
and around 1500 were injured, was a wake-up call for the political leadership 
(2005 års katastrofkommission, 2005: 102). It was suddenly realised that even 
though many agencies were engaged in the aftermath, no agency had the sole 
responsibility of creating an overview of the situation (Werger,2013).  
In 2006, new legislation came into place to task the ministries, other 
government authorities and regional and local administrations to take action in 
order to ensure that they were capable of fulfilling their tasks in times of crisis 
and other emergency situations. Regional and local administrations should, 
through these activities, achieve the capability to conduct civil defence. 
A central element of the new regulation is the areas of cooperation7 
within which government authorities are required to conduct planning in order 
to be prepared for crisis and other emergency situations (Riksdag, 2006:942, §8). 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (abbreviated MSB), established in 2009, 
supports this coordination by providing methods and networks for the 
government authorities during extraordinary events. 
A study about the need to create a national crisis management function 
at the Prime Minister's Office was conducted in 2007, leading to a new office 
being set up: the Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat (Werger, 2013).   
The 2008 war in Georgia led the Government to task the Swedish Armed 
Forces to prepare contingency plans for the military defence of Sweden, which 
had not been done since the 1990s. But it took five more years – until Spring 
2013 - for the Government to task MSB to also prepare contingency plans for 
civil defence, including private companies (Werger, 2013; Hedström, 2013).  
However, it will not be possible to rebuild the Total Defence system that 
existed during the Cold War as the military, civil society and the threats 
themselves have changed (Werger, 2013; Hedström, 2013). The Armed Forces 
are no longer primarily designed to deploy a large reserve force in order to repel 
an armed attack against the whole of Sweden, but to participate in expeditionary 
operations with high readiness units manned with all-volunteer contracted 
personnel.  
Civil society has also changed radically:  
 Internationalisation means that the Swedish economy is now intertwined 
with that of the rest of the world. Sweden is no longer self-sufficient 
regarding energy, telecommunications, transportation, commodities or 
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food supply. Sweden lacks control over the flows of these resources, 
which also makes it no longer possible to plan for security of supply in the 
same way as earlier. 
 Privatisation has meant that important infrastructure, such as harbours, 
airports, electricity and communication networks no longer belongs to 
the state and that ownership is more diverse than earlier. Foreign 
ownership has also increased drastically.  
 Efficiency improvements in terms of ‘lean production’ and ‘just in time’ 
have led to radically decreasing stocks. Previously existing buffer stocks 
that were intended to be used in times of crisis or war have been 
eliminated. This applies also to the public sector and even healthcare 
depends nowadays on very small margins. The only stocks that exist 
include fuel and medicine (Werger, 2013). 
 Development of technical infrastructure has led to increased dependence 
on a robust supply of electricity and the availability of 
telecommunications.  
 Development of information technology has created new problems 
regarding dependence and vulnerability. Internet and social media has 
created new challenges for contingency planning, e.g. cyber-attacks.  
 
These changes in society mean that old concepts are no longer valid and 
need to be abolished (FHS, 2013: 4-5). 
In December 2012, the Swedish National Defence College was tasked by MSB 
to propose an action plan for the creation of a new civil defence system to be 
integrated into modern society. A draft report highlighted the previous (1990s) 
legislation’s focus on civil defence as an activity and compared this with the 
more modern approach to consider civil defence as a capability (Ibid, 6). 
 II.4.2 Key concepts 
While the total defence concept is still valid and has not been erased 
from the legislation, current policy documents no longer use this term. The latest 
report presented by the joint parliament-government committee on defence 
policy (Försvarsberedningen) on 31 May 2013 refers to the comprehensive 
approach to security (Regeringskansliet Försvarsdepartementet, 2012: 222). The 
report states that ‘Security is a wider term than just protection of own physical 
territory. 
The joint committee also states that ‘interaction between civil and 
military crisis management actors can deepen further. This is applicable both for 
military support to other elements of society and the civil authorities as well as 
the support made available by those civil authorities to the Armed Forces to 
enable them to fulfil their tasks.’ (Ibid, 225). 
 II.4.3 Underlying principles 
The Swedish crisis management system is guided by three underlying 
principles: the principle of responsibility, the principle of proximity and the 
principle of equality (MSB, 2011:11): 
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 The principle of responsibility means that whoever is responsible for an 
activity in normal conditions should maintain that corresponding 
responsibility, as well as initiating cross-sectoral cooperation, during 
major emergencies (Ibid, 24).  
 According to the principle of proximity, a crisis is to be handled in the 
area where it takes place, and be managed by those most closely affected 
and responsible. Crisis management should only be referred to higher 
levels if it is considered necessary (Ibid). 
 The principle of continuity means that an organisation’s activities and 
location should, as far as possible, be kept the same during a crisis. 
Changes to an organisation should be no larger than is necessary to 
handle the crisis (Ibid). 
 A further principle that affects crisis management is the principle of 
financing. The state has by law tasked municipalities to fulfil certain 
functions during civil contingencies and when the readiness level has 
been raised. According to this principle, the state also has to provide 
funding to enable the municipalities to fulfil these tasks (MSB, 2013: 1).  
There are of course exceptions to these formal principles. The principle of 
proximity is overruled in the case of a nuclear accident when the crisis is handled 
not according to its geographic location but by the agency that has the capability 
to handle nuclear accidents. By law there is, however,an exception from the 
principle of continuity in that municipalities are required to set up a temporary 
crisis management committee in the case of an emergency (such committees do 
not exist under the usual circumstances) (Hedström, 2013). 
There is also an additional, informal principle: the principle of solidarity. 
According to this, security shall be provided together with other nations as 
expressed by the Swedish Declaration of Solidarity. This applies to EU members, 
and to Norway and Iceland (FHS, 2013:6).  
The tasks and objectives for Swedish Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) during 
peacetime emergencies are to: 
 minimise the risks and consequences of major emergencies; 
 advance and support societal preparedness for emergencies; 
 coordinate across and between various sector boundaries and areas of 
responsibility. 
The extended international task of Swedish CEP is to increase capacities for 
dealing with a wide spectrum of situations and emergencies, ranging from 
international confidence building measures to coordinated crisis management in 
complex emergencies. 
 II.4.4 Legal aspects 
Sweden’s legal architecture is partially obsolete since some elements of 
legislation date from the early 1990s, although new laws have been adopted 
later to reflect developments in specific areas.  
According to the Law on Total Defence, adopted in 1992 (Riksdag, 
1992:1403), Total Defence is defined as activities undertaken in order to prepare 
Sweden for war. Total Defence consists of Military Activities (military defence) 
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and Civil Activities (civil defence). In times of war, civilian agencies and other 
organisations support the Armed Forces. In peace time, civil defence includes 
activities in local municipalities, and on the regional and national levels aimed at 
raising society’s capability to resist an armed attack (MSB, 2012b). 
The law defines various levels of readiness. Once the readiness level has 
been raised, local municipalities and county councils (Landsting) as well as those 
private companies and organisations that are also committed to operate during 
war, must take action with regard to planning their activities and managing their 
personnel and other resources that will enable them to fulfil these 
commitments. When the highest level of readiness is proclaimed, Total Defence 
is equal to all activities that society undertakes (Riksdag, 1992:1403).  
MSB uses the term civil protection that is defined (MSB, 2012:45) as public 
safety in the form of: 
1. protection from incidents and accidents, including everyday accidents; 
2. emergencies and disasters; 
3. civil defence.  
When analysing the existing legislation, it is obvious that it has been 
gradually developed over the last 20 years. The Law on Total Defence, adopted 
immediately after the end of the Cold War, focuses on military threats against 
the nation and states that the task of civil defence is to support the Armed 
Forces, not the other way around. Later laws and regulations foresee that the 
Armed Forces should be able to support civil society during emergencies and 
disasters. The responsibility for civil emergency planning is managed by three 
different levels of government – national, regional, and local.  
 II.4.5 The national level 
On the national level, the Government has the executive power and 
governs the nation (Riksdag, 1974:152, Chapter 1, §6). The Government is 
responsible for issuing policies for crisis management, exercising overall strategic 
coordination and determining priorities. In addition, the Government is 
responsible for effective crisis management, relations with the public and media, 
and international coordination with other nations and organisations. All 
operational activities are delegated to civil authorities. 
Unlike their counterparts in many other countries, Swedish ministers 
have limited opportunities to take independent decisions. All government 
decisions are taken collectively by the Government as a whole after the matter 
has been well prepared and agreement reached. The Prime Minister bears the 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring that policies are coordinated and follow the 
same line (the Government at work). Only regarding the Swedish Armed Forces 
does the Constitution allow the minister in charge (that is the Minister of 
Defence) to take decisions under the supervision of the Prime Minister (Riksdag, 
1974:152, Chapter 7, §3). The Prime Minister chairs Cabinet meetings but has no 
authority to take decisions in the name of the Government or in any other 
capacity.  
The Prime Minister's Office is headed by the Prime Minister. Attached to 
the Prime Minister's Office is the Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat. 
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According to the Government Offices of Sweden, the Crisis Management 
Coordination Secretariat is responsible for  
 policy intelligence and situation reporting; 
 crisis management and crisis communications; 
 analysis; 
 being a central contact point at the Government Offices. 
The Secretariat's role is to conduct continual policy intelligence activities. It 
follows events both inside and outside Sweden around the clock. The Secretariat 
also fulfils an important function by supporting the ministries in their 
development of crisis management and crisis communication, arranging training 
and exercises and producing analyses of threats and risks that could affect 
Sweden. 
In a crisis, the Secretariat supports the Government Offices in managing the 
crisis. Crisis management tasks include raising the alarm and obtaining an overall 
picture of the situation and a view of the joint impact on society of the individual 
events. The Head of the Secretariat is also able, if necessary, to start crisis 
management measures in the Government Offices. After the crisis has been 
dealt with, the Secretariat has to be able to follow up and evaluate the measures 
taken (Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat). 
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has overall political responsibility for 
military defence and civil emergency preparedness. Under the MOD, the 
Swedish Armed Forces are responsible for military defence and the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB) for civil emergency preparedness.  
The task of the MSB is to enhance and support societal capacities for 
preparedness for and prevention of emergencies and crises. When an emergency 
or crisis occurs, MSB supports the stakeholders involved by taking the measures 
necessary to control the situation (MSB – Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). 
MSB holds a mandate for a holistic and all-hazards approach to emergency 
management, including the entire spectrum of threats and risks, from everyday 
accidents to major disasters.  
Crisis management at the Government Offices is based on a joint cross-
sector approach. Every government office is responsible for planning and 
handling crises within its own area of responsibility. Authorities and agencies at 
the national level are also assigned complementary tasks by the government 
during major emergency situations. 
Every government agency is also responsible for civil emergency planning in 
its own area of expertise, and the MSB has the task of coordinating the various 
stakeholders. This responsibility applies to measures taken before, during, and 
after the occurrence of emergencies and disasters. All Swedish authorities are 
obliged to carry out risk and vulnerability analyses in their own areas in an effort 
to strengthen their own, and Sweden’s overall emergency management capacity 
(MSB – Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). Authorities providing vital services 
must have a point of contact available on a 24/7 basis and also a command and 
control capability (Werger, 2013). 
There is no longer a legal mechanism committing private companies to also 
operate during war time. During the Cold War, a number of designated 
companies were tasked with the production necessary for war time needs. These 
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companies were also responsible for protecting their production facilities. Some 
only had to increase their production in times of war, others had to switch their 
production from peace time commodities to meet war time needs (Bergrum.se, 
2013). This is again under consideration, as many functions vital for society are 
today provided by private companies (Werger, 2013). 
 II.4.6 The regional level 
At the regional level, the county administrative boards are responsible for 
the coordination of civil emergency activities such as exercises, risk and 
vulnerability analyses. They also act as a clearing house between public and 
private partners. During a crisis, the administrative boards coordinate the 
relevant measures with relevant actors. The county administrative boards have 
overall responsibility for reporting the need for host nation support in the event 
of a major emergency. Additionally, the county administrative boards also 
coordinate contact with the mass media during major emergencies, crises, and 
disasters (MSB – Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency). 
 II.4.7 The local level 
Swedish municipalities have a large degree of autonomy and play an 
important role in civil emergency planning and preparedness. During a major 
emergency the municipal executive board is the highest civilian authority within 
the municipality, and is responsible for all civilian command and crisis 
management at the local level. Municipalities are supported and assisted in this 
role by the county administrative boards (MSB – Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency). 
 II.4.8 Mechanisms used to encourage inter-agency interactions  
MSB has, in a study, identified a number of enablers and barriers to inter-
agency cooperation. According to military personnel who participated in the 
study, there are often fundamental differences between military and civil 
organisations, both in domestic and international situations. One important 
barrier is the strict tradition of issuing orders in the military, whereas civil 
organisations are more used to collaborate and cooperate. ‘Operational’ 
organisations, including the military, police and rescue services, are often 
considered by the military to be clearer and more distinct when compared to 
colleagues from ‘non-operational’ organisations responsible for social care etc. 
Military organisations often face a higher rate of staff turnover due to their 
rotation system which hampers cooperation with other organisations, where 
colleagues often work together for many years (MSB, 2007:45).  
According to the same study, inter-agency cooperation can be improved 
by gaining more knowledge about partner organisations and their way of 
operating, by exchanging liaison personnel and by appointing decision makers 
with a particular set of personal skills and the ability to identify and accept 
differences (Ibid, 55). 
This suggests that any setting that involves decision makers from a wide 
range of organisations, be it on the local, regional or national level, can work 
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effectively only if the parties involved understand the resources available to and 
limitations of the other organisations. 
According to MSB, crisis management is systematically improved by using 
three different means: 
 adoption of new legislation and regulations to convince an actor that 
he/she must act; 
 providing economic incentive to make an actor realise that he/she 
benefits economically from taking certain steps; 
 educating actors to persuade people to take action because it is 
appropriate or necessary. 
The Swedish National Defence College is tasked by MSB and the Armed 
Forces to educate senior decision makers including politicians, civil servants, 
officers and other leaders from military and civil organisations, including the 
private sector (Hedström, 2013). This is accomplished through a number of 
different courses on Crisis Management, from four-day courses for the most 
senior decision makers to longer, seven-week courses for mid-level decision 
makers and experts (Bergrum.se, 2013). 
 Part II Conclusions 
In all four countries covered in this report, comprehensive thinking in 
security affairs emerged gradually and is manifested in a variety of ways. In some 
cases (e.g. in Denmark), it is oriented more towards external actions, i.e. in 
conducting complex operations abroad, and has been driven by experiences 
from such operations. In other cases, it is more domestically focused and driven 
by the adaptation of internal security systems to the contemporary security 
environment (e.g. in Finland). But even when comprehensive whole-of-
government thinking dominates both external and internal security policy and 
action, it does not necessarily mean both strands are very well tied together (e.g. 
in the Netherlands). 
All the cases contain many practices worth emulating in Estonia (see ‘Key 
Insights’ below), yet they represent different degrees of institutionalising those 
practices. Historical legacies, institutional inertia, administrative cultures and 
other factors slow down or even prevent full-fledged and sustained 
institutionalisation. There are also weaknesses which are yet to be addressed in 
most of the cases, for instance, lack of effective strategic planning systems to 
support WGA/WSA, or mature inter-agency learning mechanisms and doctrines. 
A striking feature in all cases is the centrality of defence organisations to 
the efforts to implement comprehensive security concepts. This is partly due to 
their set of missions, which include both external and internal functions and 
which span the entire spectrum of situations – from peacetime through crises to 
wars. This often makes them the central hinge on which comprehensive 
operations rely. It is also partly the legacy of the total defence paradigm, in 
which defence owned, operated or relied upon the large systems (including 
voluntary defence organisations) necessary to channel society’s resources to 
support military defence efforts. The challenge is how to build upon this legacy in 
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creating and running WGA/WSA systems in pursuit of integrated and 
comprehensive security and defence. 
 
 Key Insights from Part II 
 Political consensus (e.g. in the form of the parliamentary defence 
agreement as in Denmark) forms an important basis for a sustained 
whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to international 
and national security. 
 The terminology and narrative employed to describe WGA/WSA should 
be understandable and not antagonise various security stakeholders 
such as NGOs, or civilian security agencies (e.g. the Finnish focus on 
‘resilience’). 
 Culture matters. For instance, a preference for flexibility and informality 
(as in Denmark) or consensus-building (the Netherlands) are important 
determinants of the characteristics that WGA/WSA arrangements 
acquire. 
 A degree of formalisation and institutionalisation of WGA/WSA, 
including in inter-organisational planning, decision-making and learning, 
is necessary to make it work. 
 A set of clear principles governing the security sector and WGA/WSA (as 
in Sweden and the Netherlands) is useful in establishing common 
understanding and managing the expectations between security 
stakeholders. 
 It is necessary to establish an effective overarching structure vested 
with proper authority and supported with the necessary resources (as in 
Finland) to guide, integrate and oversee the WGA/WSA efforts – ideally, 
in the prime minister’s office. 
 ’Issue-based’ integrating units (e.g. for counter-terrorism, critical 
infrastructure protection, cyber security) are important tools in ensuring 
broad and comprehensive solutions in addressing those issues. 
 Dedicated budgetary trust funds for cross-cutting issues that do not fall 
under the full purview of a particular ministry (as for stabilisation 
missions in Denmark) provide the necessary financial basis. 
 Having a systematic and methodical approach (guidelines and toolbox) 
to monitoring, analysis, assessment and review/learning in managing 
security (as in the Netherlands) greatly benefits the WGA/WSA. 
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 Strategic planning of resources and capabilities for WGA/WSA requires 
building capacity for that in the government. 
 Voluntary organisations make important contributions to WGA/WSA, 
and using existing home guard structures is an effective way to shape 
and utilise this contribution. 
 Realistic exercises including all levels of government and all stakeholders 
relevant to different crises are necessary to develop WGA/WSA. This can 
be augmented with a coherent doctrine for comprehensive security 
missions. 
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Part III: The ‘State of Play’ in Estonia – Challenges of 
Implementing Integrated Defence8 
 Introduction 
In this part, the report examines the ‘state of play’ in Estonia when it 
comes to implementing whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches 
in national security and defence. It mostly focuses on the challenges of putting 
into practice the concept of ‘integrated defence’ (also often referred to as 
‘broad-based defence’). However, it also dwells upon various aspects of wider 
national security architecture in the country and upon interactions of civil and 
military stakeholders of security in non-defence contexts (e.g. in civil 
emergencies). First, it describes the conceptual, legal, institutional setup existing 
in Estonia; second, drawing upon a series of extensive interviews, it covers the 
expert opinions on this setup – its strengths and weaknesses as well as practices 
behind it. 
 III.1 Background 
Before 2010, the National Defence Concept of Estonia was founded on the 
principles of total defence and territorial defence. In 1993, the Parliament 
discussed the national defence concept prepared by the then Minister of 
Defence, Hain Rebane, but the draft act, ‘Foundations of National Defence’, was 
not approved. Even though a legal basis had not been established, the Defence 
Forces were built up according to the concept of total defence.  
In 1996, the Parliament approved the first national defence concept, ‘Main 
Directions of the Estonian National Defence Policy’, based on the concepts of 
total defence and territorial defence. The document envisioned ‘a joint and 
coordinated deployment defence, societal, and economic resources to prevent 
or divert threat or attack’ (Riigikogu, 1996). The concept stated that in addition 
to military defence, the nation would develop Defence Forces with capabilities to 
provide military support to the civilian side to help to mitigate the consequences 
of natural emergencies, epidemics, and technical accidents, and to provide help 
to the civilian authorities in eliminating the consequences of disasters.  
The National Security Concepts of 2001 and 2004 stipulated that the basis 
of the national defence was total defence that encompassed the whole of 
society. They required the state to ensure that all structures, including the 
Defence Forces and defence structures, had been prepared to avert threats, and 
stressed that national defence policy would be implemented by the application 
of total defence and territorial defence. The 2004 document and the Military 
Defence Strategy (2001) define total defence as the permanent psychological, 
physical, economic and other types of readiness of the state and municipal 
institutions, defence forces and the whole of society to manage crises; as well as 
coordinated and joint actions to prevent and divert assaults or threats and to 
ensure the survival of nation. All ministries and municipalities would participate 
in the preparation and execution of national defence that would comprise five 
components: military, civil, economic, psychological defence and civil readiness. 
                                                 
8
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Later Military Defence Strategic Plan (2005) reiterated the principle of total 
defence.  
In 2010, the new National Security Concept (NSC) was approved by the 
Parliament, and the National Defence Strategy (NDS), which replaced the 
previous Military Defence Strategic Plan, was endorsed by the Government. Both 
documents introduced a new approach: integrated national defence replaced 
the concepts of total defence and territorial defence. According to the NDS 
(MOD, 2010), the Military Defence Development Plan 2009-2018 was to be 
replaced by a comprehensive National Defence Development Plan (NDDP) 2013-
2022. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) explained that in essence this meant that 
the national defence approach would be expanded from its previous strictly 
military domain to other domains (altogether six activity areas). This would 
require a joint development plan to be designed, since in the past national 
defence objectives had not been set for other domains. 
 III.2 Legal and institutional Framework 
Estonia’s current security and defence policies are based upon a broad 
concept of security and a broad-based approach to national defence, which have 
been formulated in the basic national defence documents: the National Security 
Concept (2010) and the National Defence Strategy (2010).9 
The National Security Concept (NSC) defines the objectives, principles and 
priorities of the nation’s security politics, and is one of the horizontal frameworks 
to be taken into account by all policy sectors when drafting development and 
action plans.10 One of the key principles of the NSC is a broad approach to 
security, which considers all the factors influencing the nation’s security. Its 
implementation encompasses all sectors vital to ensuring national security, 
including the following action areas: 
 In the area of foreign policy, the implementation of a comprehensive 
approach, consisting of military and civilian instruments and development 
aid; 
 In the area of defence policy, the implementation of a broad-based 
approach to national defence, consisting of military defence, civil 
contributions to military defence, assurance of internal security, 
international activity, securing the continuous operation of vital services, 
and psychological defence; 
                                                 
9
 The main legal acts regulating national defence are: the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 
the National Security Concept, the Peacetime National Defence Act, the War-Time National 
Defence Act, the State of Emergency Act, the Emergency Act, the International Military 
Cooperation Act, the National Defence Duties Act, the National Defence Strategy, and the 
National Defence Development Plan 2013–2022. According to the Peacetime National Defence 
Act, the basic plans for national defence are: the Bases of Security Policy, the National Defence 
Strategy, the Military Defence Development Plan, the Military Defence Action Plan, and the 
Emergency Defence Plan. 
10
 The NSC is authorised by the Parliament following a proposal from the Government. The 
Government then approves the NDS and enacts the NDDP. Before authorising or amending the 
NSC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence are required to consider the 
positions of the National Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Parliament, and before authorising or enacting the NDS or the NDDP, the Minister of Defence is 
required to consider the position of the National Defence Committee. 
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 In the area of security policy, ensuring internal security as it pertains to 
national security, including protection of the constitutional order, 
resolution of emergencies, guarding the external border, and fighting 
terrorism, international organised crime, and corruption; 
 Ensuring the resilience and cohesion of society, consisting of areas such 
as the continuous operation of vital services, electronic communication, 
cyber and energy security, transport infrastructure, security of the 
financial system and the environment, harmonised regional 
development, integration, psychological defence and public health 
protection (Riigikogu, 2010). 
The broad-based approach to national defence encompasses all the options 
available to the state authorities and the population to ensure the nation’s 
security in the case of military activity against Estonia. The comprehensive 
planning of national defence is based upon the National Defence Strategy (NDS), 
which is based on the principle that all state authorities are responsible for their 
respective areas of competence both in peacetime and in the case of war; in 
other words, during all stages of the escalation of a conflict.11 National defence 
planning involving all state authorities is based on the National Defence 
Development Plan (NDDP) 2013–2022, which specifies the courses of action and 
capability requirements of national defence.12 
Since 1 January 2012, the role of the Government Office in leading and 
coordinating integrated national defence has been strengthened in order to 
better implement a broad-based approach. The National Security Coordination 
Unit of the Estonian Government Office was renamed the National Security and 
Defence Coordination Unit of the Estonian Government Office and two new 
positions were created to deal with issues relating to national defence. In 
addition to organising the operation of the Government National Security 
Committee, the Government Office was tasked with advising the Prime Minister 
on matters relating to national defence, and with coordinating the leadership of 
national security and national defence. The larger role given to the Government 
Office in organising national defence was motivated by a desire to improve 
cooperation between state authorities, streamline the decision-making process, 
and harmonise the main courses of action of national defence. 
Separate ministries are in charge of the six main courses of action of 
integrated defence: the MOD is in charge of military defence and civilian sector 
support; the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is in charge of ensuring internal 
security and sustainability of vital services; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
is in charge of international efforts; and the Government Office is in charge of 
psychological defence.13 
                                                 
11
 During an emergency situation, the usual models of leadership and chains of command can 
change. The management of a state of emergency is led by the Government; with the Prime 
Minister in overall control. 
12
 In January 2013, the Government enacted the NDDP 2013–2022, which specifies the courses of 
action and capability requirements for national defence. The plan, complemented by non-military 
action areas, will be presented to the Government in the 1st quarter of 2014. The NDDP replaced 
the earlier Military Defence Development Plan, which only dealt with military capability planning. 
13
 The main laws governing the application of the broad-based approach to national defence are: in the area 
of military defence, the Peacetime National Defence Act, the War-Time National Defence Act, the 
International Military Cooperation Act, the Estonian Defence Forces Organisation Act, and the Defence 
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 III.2.1 National Defence Act and NDDP  
The National Defence Act is currently being drafted with the aim of 
implementing the principles of the NDS. It will amalgamate different national 
defence acts (the Peacetime National Defence Act, the Wartime National 
Defence Act, and the International Military Cooperation Act) into a single legal 
act. 
The drafting of the NDDP 2013-2022 started in February 2012, and before 
the end of the year it became clear that only the military part could be 
accomplished in time. By the end of 2013, the military plan had been 
complemented with the contributions of other actors. The main coordinator for 
drafting was the MOD, and the ministries participating in the drafting process 
were: the MOI, the Ministry of Communications and Economic Affairs (MEAC), 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
(MSA), the MFA, and the Government Office. The Bank of Estonia and the 
Ministry of Agriculture have also been involved to a certain extent. A four year 
operation plan will be drafted once the NDDP has been approved by the 
Government, in the first quarter of 2014. 
 III.2.2 Institutional setup 
Security and national defence issues are dealt with in three strategic-level 
meeting formats whose memberships occasionally overlap: the National Security 
Committee of the Government, the Crisis Committee of the Government, and 
the National Defence Council of the President. The key actors responsible for 
security and defence issues in the executive branch are the Government Office, 
the MOD, the MFA, and the MOI. 
National Security Committee of the Government 
National Security Committee of the Government coordinates the 
activities of the security services, assesses the national security situation, 
determines the need of the state for security-related information, and advises 
the government regarding the organisation of issues concerning national defence 
(including the submission of the NSC to the Parliament, the endorsement of the 
NDS and NDDP, preparations for mobilisation, the assignmet of national defence 
duties to government agencies, and decisions regarding additional resources for 
national defence.) 
The committee is comprised of six ministers: the Prime Minister, and the 
Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice and Finance. To ensure 
more effective national security and defence governance at the government 
level, the Minister of Communication and Economic Affairs will also become a 
member of the committee.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
League Act; in the area of civilian sector support, the Government of the Republic Act, the Law of Obligations 
Act, and the National Defence Duties Act; in the area of international efforts, the Foreign Relations Act; in 
the area of internal security, the Emergency Act, the State of Emergency Act, and special acts including the 
Police and Border Guard Act, and the Rescue Act; and in the area of continous operation of vital services, the 
Emergency Act. 
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Crisis Committee of the Government 
Among other activities, the Crisis Committee of the Government monitors 
and analyses the organisation of national crisis management, including 
preparations for emergencies, the resolution of emergencies and the assurance 
of the continuous operation of vital services. If needed, the committee assists 
the authorities resolving an emergency with national impact or of particular 
severity in the organisation of the exchange of information and in co-ordination.  
The committee is led by the Minister of the Interior and is comprised of 
the Permanent Secretaries of all ministries (except the Ministry of Culture, and 
the Ministry of Science and Education). Members of the committee include also 
the Secretary of State, the Director General of the Rescue Board, the Chief of 
Staff of the Headquarters of the Defence Forces, the advisor to the Prime 
Minister for national defence issues, and other senior government officials.  
National Defence Council 
The National Defence Council of the President discusses issues important 
to national defence and gives its opinion on them. Members of the Council are 
the Prime Minister; the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Interior, 
and Justice; the Speaker of the Parliament; the Chair of the National Defence 
Committee and the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament; 
and the Commander of the Defence Forces. It is planned that the Minister of 
Communications and Economic Affairs will also become a member of the 
Council. 
Government Office 
The Government Office assumed a greater role in national security and 
defence issues less than two years ago. The reinforced Security and National 
Defence Coordination Unit, which coordinates security and national defence 
issues, is responsible for only one activity area of the NDS: psychological defence. 
The Office has no decision-making authority over the ministries, and no legal 
mandate to enforce the implementation of government decisions. In Estonia’s 
governance system, the ministries themselves are responsible for the 
implementation of government decisions that concern their administrative 
areas, but in doing so they tend to neglect the wider, whole-of government 
approach.  
There is little that the Government Office can do to improve ministerial 
performance beyond providing counsel. Rather, its role has been to work to 
balance the interests of different ministries and seek common ground. As noted 
previously, its legal mandate includes advising the Prime Minister on security and 
national defence issues, managing the operations of the Government’s National 
Security Committee, and coordinating the command of security and national 
defence. The recent steps to grant a greater security and national defence role to 
the Government Office are welcome in this background. 
In addition to the reinforcement of the Security and National Defence 
Coordination Unit, a position of the National Defence Adviser of the Prime 
Minister (presently a retired general) who supports him on security and defence 
issues has been established. Moreover, a government official disclosed that in 
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the near future the Government Office will assume the lead coordinating role in 
drafting the fundamental national security and defence documents such as the 
NSC (drafting this document has so far been the responsibility of the MFA) and 
NDS (so far the responsibility of the MOD).  
Ministry of Defence 
The MOD formulates national defence policy and participates in the 
formulation of national security policy. It also coordinates the implementation of 
NDS and the development of NDDP. The subordinate agencies executing these 
policies are: Defence Forces and Defence League, Defence Resources Board, 
Information Board (external intelligence service). 
Ministry of the Interior 
The MOI has the missions of assuring the internal security of the state 
and protecting public order, guarding and protecting the state border, and 
assuring the border regime. The MOI is also tasked to regulate crisis 
management and rescue works. It develops internal security policies and plans, 
including for wartime. The subordinate agencies executing these functions and 
policies are: Police and Border Guard Board, Rescue Board, Internal Security 
Service (Kapo). 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The MFA formulates and implements main directions of foreign policy, 
and organises and coordinates international relations of the republic. It works 
out the draft security policy concept in cooperation with the relevant 
government agencies. In wartime and under the conditions of mobilisation it 
prepares and organises diplomatic representation with foreign states and 
international organisations. 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 
The MEAC organises the continuous operation of the 19 vital services 
including electricity, fuel and gas supply; transportation (airports, ports and 
railway) and roads; communications and broadcasting networks; uninterrupted 
communication, etc. Its tasks in preparation for wartime include determining the 
wartime needs of the industrial sector and preparing the wartime tasks assigned 
to the industrial sector, as well as organising the acquisition and storage of the 
relevant stockpile. It prepares the organisation of construction and public work 
corresponding to wartime condition. It works out building regulations and 
operational rules for railways, waterways, roads, ports and airports, as well as 
prepares the organisation of transport operations and traffic corresponding to 
national defence requirements. 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
The MSA organises the functioning of in-patient specialised medical care 
and emergency medical care. It also organises functioning of drinking water 
safety control and blood service. Under the conditions of mobilisation and 
wartime the MSA prepares and organises the provision of medical care and the 
prevention of outbreak and spread of infectious diseases. 
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Ministry of Agriculture 
The Ministry of Agriculture organises the continuous operation of the 
functioning of the control of food safety. The Ministry of Agriculture or an 
authority within the area of its governance forms the state food stockpile for 
wartime. 
Other ministries 
 In addition, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of Finance are in charge of organising sustainability of vital services of 
special importance for security and integrated defence under their respective 
areas of governance. The Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education and 
Research contribute to integrated security and defence in the area of 
psychological defence. 
Organisation at the regional level 
There are four permanent regional crisis committees, established by the 
Minister of Interior, tasked with coordinating crisis management within its 
geographical area of responsibility. Each regional crisis committee is headed by 
the Director of the Regional Rescue Centre and includes representatives from the 
Police and Border Guard (the prefect, also acting as deputy chairman), the 
governors of each of the 2-6 counties situated in the region, the mayors of the 
cities situated in the region, representatives from the Defence Forces, the 
Defence League, the Internal Security Service, the Environmental Board, the 
Environmental Inspectorate, the Estonian Road Administration, the Health Board 
and the Veterinary and Food Board. The regional crisis committees, based on the 
Emergency Act, have currently no role in case of an armed attack on Estonia as 
this Act does not regulate preparing for and resolving an emergency arising from 
a military threat.  
The regional level reflects the lack of coordination in organizing the work 
of Governmental authorities. The geographical areas of responsibilities of 
Regional Rescue Centres (päästekeskus) and the Police and Border Guard 
correspond, but they differ from the regional organisation of the Health Board, 
the Environmental Board, the Emergency Calls Centre (häirekeskus), the 
Emergency Medical Service (kiirabi) and the Defence League.  
The Defence League was, in 2013, tasked to organise territorial defence, 
but there is no regional command level. Instead, it is current territorial structure 
is based on the pre-Second World War districts that do not correspond fully with 
the current 15 counties of Estonia, nor with the boundaries of the four regional 
crisis committees. An important function in any nation is Emergency Medical 
Service, and, starting from 2014, this service is organised in ten geographical 
areas that do not correspond with any of the above mentioned organisations. 
Crisis escalation stages 
Crisis regulation is stipulated in the Emergency Act, which covers the 
preparation for an emergency, the response to an emergency and the continous 
operation of vital services.14 It also provides the procedures for the declaration 
                                                 
14
 According to the Emergency Act, crisis management is a system of measures which includes 
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of an emergency situation and sets out the coordination necessary to resolve an 
emergency situation. In addition two other types of situations that may threaten 
national security are described in the national legal framework: a state of 
emergency caused by a threat to the constitutional order; and wartime 
(Riigikogu, 1996/2011; Riigikogu, 1994/2012). 
In the case of an emergency, the leadership structures, the authorities of 
the institutions, and the responsibilities of the actors will not alter from their 
day-to-day functions and operations. However, in the case of an emergency 
situation the usual models of leadership and chains of command can change. 
Similarly, during the management of a state of emergency that is led by the 
Government, the Parliament may authorise the head of a state of emergency 
(the Prime Minister) to apply methods applicable to a state of emergency that 
may differ from daily operations. During wartime, the leadership structures may 
also alter. For example, the Commander of the Defence Forces may command 
and order individuals and legal persons who are not under his authority to 
execute duties related to national security that they have been assigned 
(Riigikogu, 1994/2012). 
 III.2.3 Best practices in inter-agency interactions 
In some narrower areas of national defence and crisis management, inter-
agency interaction has been well established. One positive example of inter-
agency interaction is the process of the risk analysis of emergency situations. 
This biennial process ensures that all involved parties have a common 
understanding of internal and external civil protection risks, and that methods to 
prevent, respond to and mitigate them will be planned and resources will be 
allocated. This process is led by the MOI, and all public and private sector actors 
in the area of civil protection are engaged (ministries and their subordinate 
agencies, critical infrastructure owners, etc.). The risk analysis describes 
emergencies, the threats that cause them, the likelihood that emergencies will 
take place, and their consequences. The government agency that, according to 
the Emergency Act, is responsible for contingency plans in its area of 
responsibility earmarks the resources required for managing crisis within this 
area (e.g. the MFA will draw up a contingency plan for consular incidents that 
may affect Estonian citizens abroad, and will earmark the resources needed to 
resolve them). 
Another successful example of inter-agency cooperation that has been 
operational for many years comes from the area of civilian support to the 
military: the reception of allied military forces. Experts interviewed fro this 
report agreed that the provision of civilian support to the military is well 
organised and that the interoperability of different actors is well developed. The 
legal framework for Host Nation Support sets out clear mandates, 
responsibilities, and tasks for all actors, and practical cooperation is regularly 
trained. Likewise, military support to civilian emergencies is also well organised. 
The Defence Forces have made their resource catalogues available to the 
civilian authorities, and military officers participate in regional crisis committees, 
alongside police and rescue services officers. 
                                                                                                                                     
preventing an emergency, preparing for an emergency, resolving an emergency and mitigating the 
consequences of an emergency (Riigikogu, 2009). 
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The annual Host Nation Support exercise, ’Baltic Host’, provides a 
practical testing ground for host nation inter-agency interaction. In November 
2013, the exercise took place in conjunction with the NATO Response Force 
exercise, ’Steadfast Jazz’. In addition to the Defence Forces, the Government 
Office, the MSA, the MEAC, the Defence Resources Board, the Police and Border 
Guard Board, the Rescue Board, the Estonian Maritime Administration, the 
Estonian Road Administration, the Estonian Health Board, the Estonian Technical 
Surveillance Authority, and the Estonian Internal Security Service took part in this 
exercise. Several state-owned and private sector enterprises also participated 
(e.g. the electricity system operator Elering, Estonian Railways, the Port of 
Tallinn, and Tallinn Airport).  
Another positive example of the implementation of the concept of 
integrated defence is provided by the Defence League. Members of the League 
represent many civilian professions in the public and private sectors (policemen, 
firemen, rescue workers, doctors, IT-specialists, etc.). These people will use their 
personal and professional links and networks to fulfill their national defence 
tasks within the League. Another excellent example of public-private partnership 
is the Cyber Defence Unit of the Defence League, where voluntary contribution 
is seen as a force multiplier – voluntary members are willing to contribute even 
more than hired IT-specialists. 
 III.3 Expert opinions  
This part of the report gives an overview of the opinions of 18 government 
officials, who were interviewed about the success of the implementation of the 
concept of integrated national defence.15 It is structured according to the key 
factors identified by the officials to have had the greatest impact on 
implementation: philosophical understanding of integrated (broad based) 
national defence, strategic and long-term planning, and coordinated 
implementation. 
 III.3.1 Philosophical understanding of integrated national defence  
The majority of experts said that the implementation of the integrated 
national defence system would take many years, because it requires the altering 
of old mindsets, traditions and habits, the introduction of new planning 
procedures, the solicitation of common understandings, etc. Some of the 
experts argued that the understanding of current security trends at the political 
level and in society is inadequate -- commercial and soft values predominate 
over hard security concerns, although the latter have not disappeared. It was 
argued by one expert that many politicians and high-level government officials 
who are not dealing with national defence issues do not understand why the 
state should spend on defence, especially as allied and national threat 
perceptions rule out the possibility of military conflict in the scope of the next 
decade. However, as the security context changes, the NSC and NDS – the state’s 
                                                 
15
 Interviewed experts were currently employed, or had been employed in the recent past in: the 
Defence Forces, the MOD, the MOI, the MEAC, the MSA, the MFA, the Government Office, the 
Police and Border Guard Board, and the Rescue Board. They included officials in strategic 
leadership (Permanent Secretaries, Undesecretaries, Deputies to the Heads of the Institutions), 
Heads of Departments, and working level experts. 
  
Comprehensive Security and Integrated Defence | ICDS Report  
 
56 
 
fundamental security and defence documents -- should be reviewed periodically, 
and more often than currently, because the global and regional security situation 
changes much faster.  
Many experts agreed that Estonian society needs a broader, academic 
discussion about the long-term strategic security and defence vision. A contract 
between the major political parties that set priorities and allocated resources to 
address the regional aspects of national security would be welcome (e.g. the 
parties could agree to maintain a symbolic presence of the Defence Forces in 
Northeast Estonia). The gulf in mindsets and perceptions between the 
Government and Parliament on the one side, and society on the other side, is 
deep; as as is the divide between bigger towns and peripheral rural areas. The 
Government should thus initiate a broad-based discussion involving universities, 
think tanks, parliament, opinion leaders, etc. on the purpose and vision of 
integrated national defence. 
The concept of integrated national defence is also understood very 
differently among government actors – each actor interprets it in a way that is 
convenient for them. Integrated national defence has not been implemented in 
the strategic planning processes. The Government has not formed a common 
view on national defence issues, individual ministers compete with each other 
for resources, and each ministry approaches national defence issues from its 
own vertical silo. In the Estonian governance model, each ministry has full 
authority over its policy domain, and as the Prime Minister commands no 
authority over the ministers, he has no instrument to enforce Government 
decisions against will of a minister. Each ministry has full independence over its 
administrative area and there is no overarching authority or strategy that would 
harmonise their activities.16 
The experts reiterated that in essence, integrated national defence is 
nothing new: it is total defence. Total defence and integrated defence can both 
understood as the mobilisation of the resources of the whole of society to 
defend the state during periods of crisis and war. The concept of ’integrated 
national defence’ extends the domains of activity of total defence by adding 
international activity, and ensuring internal security and the provision of vital 
services. Thus, integrated national defence encompasses, in addition to military 
defence and civilian contribution to it, many non-military areas. In a worse-case 
scenario, an adversary will make use several of these domains and may exploit 
many tools in a coordinated manner. This means that the state must prepare to 
defend against military and non-military threats. The NDS asserts that in the 
preparation for crisis and in times of crisis, state, actions must be coordinated at 
the operational level taking into account a whole-of-government perspective. 
The strategy provides a framework for ’pooling and sharing’ – i.e. allowing 
military and civilian assets to be used interchangeably.  
Both fundamental security and defence documents – the NSC and NDS – 
received some criticism from the experts. One expert claimed that the NSC is not 
                                                 
16
 Estonia’s governance structure is founded on a system of independent ministries, each 
responsible for its own area of competence. The Prime Minister’s role is one among equals. OECD 
Public Governance Reviews: Estonia. (OECD 2011:120). 
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a systematic document, because national interests have not been prioritised and 
categorised, and methods to achieve them have not been designated.17  
Likewise, the NDS should be viewed as a political statement rather than 
as a strategic guideline, and it does not fulfill the criteria for a national strategy -- 
the means to achieve the ends, and where these resources should come from 
have not been designated.  It is thus difficult to make strategic plans based on 
these documents. Another expert believed that the NDS is an entirely 
unprofessional and abortive document. He claimed that as a planning document 
it is obsolete, because the authorities and mandates of different government 
institutions overlap in all six activity areas, and it is not clear what a particular 
area consists of and who is responsible for activities within it (e.g. civil support to 
military defence; international activities, securing vital services).18 He also 
suggested that the government’s endeavour to develop the NDDP 2013-2022 
through inter-agency process was not sensible, because the task was 
overwhelming.  
Interestingly, even though all experts believed that the underlying 
principles of the NDS have been understood and accepted by all actors, some 
experts claimed that the principles have been discussed and argued over only in 
a small circle of government officials. A few experts thought that some of the 
principles may be imprudent in practice, and should be reconsidered through 
broader and academic discussions. For example, the principle that all actors will 
be responsible for the same activity areas across all crisis escalation levels was 
questioned – it was argued that in the case of mobilisation much more authority 
and greater capabilities would be needed, and thus responsibilities should shift.19 
Another expert suggested that the concept of integrated defence is not 
completely clear, and that a lot of discussions, engagement, practical 
workshops and exercises would be necessary to reach a common 
understanding and mindset.20  
It was also argued that although everyone understands and supports the 
principles and objectives of the concept of integrated national defence on a 
general level, there is lack of understanding of the essence and implications of 
the concept across all ministries, resulting in a lack of competence. This, in turn, 
hinders the implementation of the concept. The ministries organise their 
                                                 
17
 At the same time, one respondent argued that the Parliament should approve only some 
general philosophical guidelines of national security, and not an executive document that 
determines the objectives, actions, means and resources for attaining national interests.  
18
 By contrast, the previous version of the document, the military strategy from 2001, clearly laid 
out who is responsible for what (e.g. the MSA prepares for and executes healthcare services 
during crisis and war times), and what each activity area consists of (e.g. civil readiness included 
the preparation for crisis and war time; as well as all activities for ensuring the long term 
functionality of the defence forces and society during crisis and war time). 
19
 Mobilisation means the transfer from peacetime to wartime readiness and, in addition to the 
military, it includes other actors: police and internal security forces, rescue services and border 
guard, military and civilian healthcare system, etc. During crisis or war there will be additional 
demand for law enforcement to support military activities (e.g. the police will organise the 
evacuation of citizens, there will be greater demand for medical services, etc). 
20
 The same lack of clarity also affects other cross-sectoral policy subjects (e.g. for many years the 
Ministry of Finance has coordinated inter-agency strategic planning and personnel policy; 
nevertheless, there is still no clear conceptual understanding by government actors of how to 
manage these subjects, what is the subject matter to be coordinated, etc.). 
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activities for peacetime duties only, and it is erroneously believed the MOD is 
responsible for wartime preparations. As one expert put it:  
Prior to the amendment of the Constitution in 2011, Estonian officers did not 
understand why the proposed changes were needed. Even today there is a lack 
of understanding across the ministries in respect to their distinctive roles in 
implementing integrated defence; there is a mistaken but widespread view that 
national defence issues ought to be handled and financed by the Ministry of 
Defence. 
Another expert suggested a way forward: 
We need to create an understanding that the peacetime and wartime structures 
and composition of the defence and internal security forces are different. We 
need respective contingency plans that take into account which additional 
resources are needed across all NDS areas. We need to determine the 
responsibilities and obligations of state institutions, municipalities, private 
companies, and individuals during crisis and wartime; each party has their own 
role in national defence. 
Thus, while it was confirmed during the interviews that, in general, actors 
do understand that the roles and responsibilities of different actors will remain 
the same during different crisis escalation levels, there seems to be at least 
some degree of confusion regarding who does what that merits more detailed 
explanation. For example, the leadership of the Rescue Board stated that the 
Board would continue its peacetime activities during wartime, that it would 
prioritise its activities according to the needs of national security (e.g. some 
peacetime services would not be provided), and that wartime activities would be 
carried out under different (military) command. However, according to one 
interviewed expert, the leadership of the Board has no clear understanding of 
the kind of command structure under which it would operate during a state of 
emergency or in wartime. 
The interviews also revealed some distrust between the actors that 
suggests a lack of information or insufficient interaction. One respondent 
believed that MOD exploits the concept of integrated national defence as an 
opportunity to delegate to other actors the military defence-related duties that it 
is ought to take care of itself. It was also believed that only a small circle of 
officials who deal with the issue on a daily basis really understand it, while the 
leadership of the ministries does not perceive the necessity to implement the 
concept in practice (mainly because security risks and threats addressed by the 
NDS are not imminent). It was also suggested than an outside objective expert 
view would be needed. 
With regard to the civilian health care sector, interviewees argued that 
the concept of integrated defence has been accepted by all actors, but that this 
has not been enough to implement it in practice.  They suggested that, most 
importantly, the MOD and Defence Forces ought to explain to the health care 
sector its concrete roles, responsibilities and duties, and identify indispensable 
capabilities for performing these roles; the health care sector itelf does not have 
the competence and resources to do so. Likewise, with regard to developing the 
military health care system for wartime, the MOD and Defence Forces ought to 
have at least a basic knowledge of the civilian health care system (which they 
currently do not), and the separate systems should be developed in coordination 
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(which they have not been) to ensure that they will be interoperable (which at 
the moment cannot be guaranteed). Thus, mutual education on the military and 
civilian health care systems should be provided for both civilian and military 
actors, and the development plans of those systems should be coordinated..  
 III.3.2 Strategic, mid- and long-term planning 
Estonia’s public administration functions on the basis of multiple 
strategic plans, many of which are not implemented.21 The majority of experts 
stressed that the establishment of strategic and long-term planning will take 
many years. It has taken ten years for the MOI to build up a crisis management 
system and the key requirement to apply whole-of-government approach to 
crisis management -- that ministries fulfil their functions effectively – has still not 
been attained. Strategic planning capabilities are weak in all ministries across 
all policy areas. Another obstacle for whole-of-government strategic planning is 
the lack of a central coordination authority to guide and oversee the process. 
Presently, each ministry develops its own development plans, which may not 
relate to each other. Horizontal coordination across cross-sectoral policy subjects 
should be strengthened, and the central coordinator must gain legal mandate to 
oversee and -- if necessary -- to coerce other ministries to implement decisions 
of the government.22 
There is great difference between the well-established strategic planning 
system within the military (and to a lesser extent in the law enforcement 
agencies) that has been practised since the preparation of the first Annual 
National Programme in the framework of the Membership Action Plan at the 
beginning of the millennium, and procedures in other government agencies 
which have no such experience. NATO’s strategic planning manual, used by the 
Defence Forces, is too complicated to suit other actors. An associated challenge 
is the need to change the mindsets of other actors so as to be receptive to long-
term strategic planning. A further obstacle is the unpredictability of financial 
resources in the mid- and long-term for all ministries other than the MOD 
(there is political consensus to allocate 2% of GDP for defence spending in long-
term). The organisational development plans of other ministries are linked to the 
state budget strategy and take only a four-year perspective. Their annual 
budgets are thus subject to greater flux, and within these budgets the proportion 
that is to be spent on security and defence capabilities is not specified. Struggling 
with shrinking budgets and incremental increasing expenditure, the ministries 
tend to spend all their money on current functions, and not on preparation for 
possible security threats in the distant future. One expert suggested that 
variations in the annual budget of the Ministry of Defence affect merely the 
amounts available for investments, while for other ministries the fluctuation of 
budget also impacts everyday functions, not to mention planning. 
                                                 
21
 Currently there are three key horizontal documents in place providing the main strategic 
direction, among them the NSC. OECD Public Governance Reviews: Estonia.( OECD 2011:173). 
22
 The Government Act establishes a decentralised governance model with each ministry having 
full independence over policy making within its administrative area. The Act does not provide for 
a horizontal cross-sectoral coordination role for a single ministry, and this causes a fundamental 
problem for horizontal cooperation in all areas where cross-sectoral coordination is needed 
(internal security, vital services, etc.).  
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Most experts agreed that their ministries and subordinate agencies 
should plan and prepare for their wartime national defence duties and tasks, but 
they do not know how to do that. They look to the MOD to provide guidance. 
Furthermore, the leadership of the ministries have no information about how 
the other ministries are planning to organise their activities within the 
framework of the NDDP. The actual implementation process of the NDDP, which 
will start in 2014, will show if different ministerial development plans are 
compatible and if national defence capabilities are interoperable. 
The development of strategic planning is also constrained by a lack of 
expert opinions on the criteria against which to evaluate wartime civilian 
capabilities. For example: who should set the requirements and standards for 
the functioning of mobile communications during the full spectrum of 
emergency situations and in wartime; or who should set the traffic volume 
requirements for roads and bridges? The Defence Forces and the ministries who 
are responsible for these policy areas have no expertise or resources to hire 
additional staff members to solve the issues that fall between the 
administrative areas of individual ministries. 
Another complication is the abundance of strategic and development 
plans that have not been coordinated with each other. In addition to cross-
cutting sector-wide governmental development plans (valitsuse arengukavad) 
each ministry has its own mid-term organisational strategies, which have not 
usually been coordinated with each other. Often, they do not take into account 
overarching horizontal security documents such as the NSC, or other cross-
sectoral strategies such as the NDS. 
Inter-agency cooperation is well established at the operational level (see 
the ‘coordinated implementation’ section of this chapter below); however, this is 
mainly due to personal relations. Achieving joint strategic planning across the 
ministries has been more difficult and here, each ministry strongly prioritises its 
own policy areas.  
Sometimes, ministerial development plans will be drafted or projects 
initiated without coordinating with the actors who will be involved in their 
implementation. One interviewee alleged, for example, that no representative 
of the civilian healthcare system participates in the development of the annual 
military healthcare plan; or vice versa, the civilian good will agreement on 
healthcare has been developed without the participation of a military officer. 
Another example was brought by the MOD: ministries tend to coordinate their 
projects too late and as a result, national defence requirements are not met. 
Another problem pertaining to resources is that when national defence 
requirements require additional investments, it is not clear who should cover 
them: the ministry who owns the project or the MOD.   
 III.3.3 Strategic planning manuals and toolboxes 
In general, all interviewees supported the idea of introducing specific 
strategic planning manuals and toolboxes. A practical and concise manual (as 
phrased by one respondent, a ’doctrine’) to raise awareness on the political level 
and amongst the population at large would be useful. Another expert believed 
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that an inter-agency handbook for planning, describing what was to be done 
and who would be responsible, would be important. 
However, it was also suggested that abstract educational tools are not 
needed at the working level, for government officials whose everyday duties 
include planning for integrated national defence. First, the only officials able to 
write the manuals would be the same handful of experts who actually need to 
implement the integrated approach; second, at the working level, there is 
already consensus on objectives and methods - the issue is rather how to 
overcome structural problems.  
One expert insisted that the problem lies not in a lack of guidelines or 
tools, but in a lack of competent personnel with in-depth expert knowledge on 
particular narrow policy subjects. So far integrated national defence planning 
has remained on a very general level due to a lack of competent experts able to 
assess the impact of the different factors and events described in the threat 
scenarios. For example, in the case of a particular internal/domestic security 
incident, assessments are required of which vital services would be continuously 
provided to the population, to what extent and in which regions, what the 
effects of disruptions would be, which capabilities and equipment would be 
needed, etc. Currently there is a lack of such experts behind the planning tables. 
It was also maintained that for a small nation such as Estonia, the best 
strategic planning tool would be a practical and concise description of the 
working procedures (Standard Operating Procedures). The aim of such a 
practical regulation (eeskiri) that can be applied at the operational level during 
exercises is to facilitate practical inter-agency cooperation.  
 III.3.3 Financial and human resources  
In most ministries other than the MOD, financial resources are planned 
only for day-to-day activities. One respondent estimated that due to cuts and 
frugality, in some areas of civilian crisis management even the most basic 
capabilities are missing. Police, rescue service and health care sector experts 
argued that the annual budgets of their agencies are not sufficient for even their 
day-to-day activities making it doubtful that additional resources could be 
allocated. Moreover, preparation for wartime tasks has not been an immediate 
concern for ministers, and there is an overall lack of resources for investments 
and for the development of wartime capacities. Capabilities for major 
emergency situations can be assembled, and ministries have prepared for non-
military emergency scenarios, but scenarios and preparations should also be 
extended to wartime. Current levels of readiness are insufficient for the larger 
scale capabilities needed in wartime. Medical reserves (tegevusvarud) are 
planned for emergencies, but do not take wartime needs into account. 
In some policy areas a solution could be the more efficient cross-sectoral 
use of existing capabilities and assets. For instance, instead of providing a 
civilian general practitioner (perearst) to active-duty military personnel 
(tegevväelane) and to conscripts, a contingent doctor could fulfil this role; 
similarly for nurses and other medical personnel in support functions. 
Streamlining would help to save money that could be used for wartime 
preparations.  One positive example is that the MOD supports the teaching of 
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war and disaster medicine in higher education medical schools and universities 
for nurses, midwifes, and doctors (for doctors it is mandatory). 
 III.3.4 Coordinated implementation 
A prerequisite for the voluntary engagement in and commitment by all 
actors to the implementation of the NDS is the achievement of consensus about 
the substance of the concept. This will take many more years of concerted effort, 
as explained in previous sections of this chapter. 
Still, most experts agreed that working level inter-agency interaction 
functions fairly well, although it still needs to become more effective and 
efficient, and resources should be better planned. As put by a senior expert: ’in 
military terminology we have achieved clear “unity of purpose”, and now we 
need to achieve “unity of effort“’. 
Integrated national defence involves a large number of ministries, and the 
engagement of ministries who are inexperienced in the culture of strategic 
planning is a huge challenge. Better coordination mechanisms will be needed for 
the successful implementation of the concept. Because ministries are driven by 
narrow mandates, an overarching central authority should be established to 
form a whole-of-the-government picture of national defence. There should be a 
clear procedure for taking contentious issues (e.g. issues concerning resources 
that ministers cannot agree on) to the Government level. So far, such issues 
have been discussed only at ministerial level (and solutions have not been 
found).  
In some policy areas, for example in the area of civilian and military 
healthcare, a joint ’owner’ would be necessary. As discussed in the ‘strategic 
planning’ section of this chapter, these two systems are planned by different 
actors (the MSA and the MOD), and more coordination is needed to ensure their 
linkage.23 
While in principle all actors support the objectives of integrated national 
defence, the devil lies in the details. Ministries are reluctant to entrustassets to 
other actors or delegate some of their own authority. The leadership of the 
ministries expects stronger guidance from the MOD regarding how they should 
prepare wartime capabilities and assets (including detailed information on 
numbers of items, their characteristics, etc.). At the same time, respondents 
believe that the MOD expects other ministries to provide ready-made lists of all 
their capabilities and assets, from which the military could choose those 
appropriate to their own needs. These different expectations constitute an 
obstacle to working level implementation.  
It was proposed that the undersecretaries of the ministries should meet 
regularly to discuss national security and defence issues, and that these 
meetings could provide inputs into the formulation of the agenda of the 
meetings of the Government’s National Security Committee. It has not so far 
been determined which meeting (e.g. the National Security Committee, the 
weekly meetings of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
                                                 
23
 The MSA and the Health Board do not have the resources to create a coordinated position. The 
MOD has developed capabilities for strategic planning: they should consider taking a greater role 
in coordination. 
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Minister of Defence, the entire Government) should address which issues, and it 
was feared that this would lead to a situation in which the opinions of some 
actors would be disregarded. It was suggested that clear guidance should be 
issued to the ministries on the type of questions (international missions, 
procurement, etc.) to be addressed in the various meeting formats. 
 III.3.5 Central coordinating authority 
Interviewees believed that the MOD, which was assigned an inter-agency 
coordinating role by the government for the NDS, and which in 2012 coordinated 
the failed effort at inter-agency process for the whole-of-government NDDP, was 
not capable of engaging other actors. They suggested that the endeavour failed 
because the MOD failed to explain the need for the development plan to other 
actors, did not acknowledge the scope of the challenge, and did not have the 
necessary experience and competence for the task. 
The majority of experts admitted that the coordination of cross-cutting 
issues is currently inadequate. Each ministry that is in charge of one activity area 
of the NDS should invite other actors to issue-based working groups or seminars, 
and explain procedures, roles, and coordination mechanisms. Regular and 
practical inter-agency training and exercises would also be most useful.  
As regards the coordination of the provision of vital services, respondents 
suggested that centrally organised coordination by one ministry would be more 
efficient than the promotion of horizontal communication between sub-units 
across different administrative areas. According to the Emergency Act, the 
continuous operation of vital services shoud be organised by the ministry that 
owns the administrative area to which a provider of a vital service belongs. For 
instance, the MEAC should organise the continuous operation of the functioning 
of the electricity supply.24 The ministries co-ordinate the assurance of the 
continuous operation of vital services within their administrative areas, and 
advise supervise the providers. The MOI is assigned a central coordinating role as 
it coordinates the organisation of the continuous operation of vital services with 
the ministries and other state authorities, but not directly with the providers of 
vital services.25 One expert suggested that a central coordinating organisation 
(the MOI) should coordinate with all providers of vital services, including 
determining their required capabilities, identifying risks and threats to critical 
infrastructure, and sharing this information with other relevant government and 
private sector actors. For example, the Cyber Defence Unit of the Defence 
League does not have sufficient personnel to carry out coordination with more 
than 200 providers of vital services.26  
                                                 
24
 The continuous operation of a vital service is the capability of the organiser of the vital service 
to function consistently and the ability to restore consistent functioning after an interruption 
(Riigikogu, 2009). 
25
 A provider of a vital service is a state or local government authority or a legal person whose 
competence includes the fulfilment of a public administration duty defined as a vital service in 
section 34 of this Act or a person operating as an entrepreneur providing a vital service in the 
case specified in subsection (2) of this section (Riigikogu, 2009). 
26
 In the organisation of mobilisation it was suggested by an expert from the MOD that the MOI, 
and not the MOD, should coordinate with local municipalities. 
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Respondees argued that the coordination of national defence with local 
governments could also be carried out more efficiently by a central coordinating 
body. The MOD requested the MOI to coordinate with local governments to 
ensure that, during mobilisation, local governments would have enough 
personnel to execute the duties assigned to them by the Peacetime National 
Defence Act. A national defence expert noted that the MOI, which is responsible 
for wartime internal national security plans and so should also have taken care of 
the organisation of local government duties during mobilisation, declined a 
coordinating role.27 This indicates that the understanding of the roles and duties 
of different ministries in national defence is not uniform, posing difficulties for 
interaction.  
Most experts agreed that the coordination capabilities of the 
Government Office should be reinforced, and that the Government Office 
should assume a more proactive approach. The Government Office should also 
assume a stronger role in inter-agency coordination by advising the Prime 
Minister on national defence issues in a timely manner, and by bringing issues to 
the Cabinet, or to the National Security committee of the Government (it was 
felt that the Government Office has so far been modest in doing so). It was 
strongly recommended that the Government Office should also take a much 
more proactive approach in managing the meetings of the Security Committee of 
the Government, including in forming its agenda, formalising meetings and 
agenda-setting, following-up on decisions, preparing substantial minutes, etc.  
Experts also supported a proposal that the mandate of the National 
Security Committee of the Government should be expanded, and that its legal 
framework should be reviewed and amended. It was also suggested that the 
Security and National Defence Coordination Unit should be staffed by politically 
unaffiliated policy experts (advisers on military, healthcare, crisis management 
and other security and defence issues) to facilitate the flow of expertise from the 
working level to the National Security Committee of the Government, and to the 
Government at large, and to create a whole-of-government view on each issue 
area. One senior expert suggested that the Headquarters of the Defence League 
could advise the Unit on the organisation of a whole-of-government command 
and strategic planning system.  
The large majority of interviewed government officials maintained that 
the legal mandate and decision-making authority of the Government Office 
should be strengthened. It was believed that no one opposes this proposal in 
principle, but when it comes to practice, the ministries are unwilling to give up 
their existing authorities or responsibilities. At the same time, one government 
official underlined that while the Government Office should assume a stronger 
coordination role, authority for command should remain in the ministries 
responsible for a particular national defence issue (e.g. in the areas of crisis 
management the MOI). According to one expert, the central governance 
                                                 
27
 According to the Peacetime National Defence Act (Riigikogu, 2002/2013), mobilisation means 
the bringing of the defence forces, national economy and state institutions from a state of peace 
to a state of war. The MOI works out national internal security plans for wartime and performs 
other tasks assigned to it by Acts for guaranteeing internal security. Local government facilitates, 
within its territory, the evacuation of persons, the accommodation and supply of the evacuated 
and the provision of medical care to them. 
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authority (whether the Government Office or some other body) must make sure 
that the ministries actually implement the decisions of the Government and its 
National Security Committee and that this must be done from a whole-of-the-
government perspective, and not according to stove-piped interests and 
priorities. 
Several experts saw a need for a central authority with a legal mandate to 
direct other ministries. It was frequently stressed that the fact that, in Estonia’s 
governance model, the ministry responsible for a particular policy subject has no 
legal mandate to force other ministries to meet their obligations constitutes a 
national security problem (e.g. the Ministry of Environment was obliged to 
prepare 24/7 radiation protection capabilities, but has not done so, while the 
MOI, which is responsible for internal security and crisis management, can do 
little more than point out the existing deficiencies in radiation protection 
capabilities). 
 III.3.6 Leadership and command structure for integrated defence 
The issue of leadership and command structure was the biggest mystery 
for the interviewed government experts. While all experts agreed that the 
ministries would continue to implement their peacetime tasks during non-
military emergencies and during military conflict or war, there was significant 
confusion and a lack of knowledge about authority, and the leadership and 
command structures. The experts pointed out that the legislation does not 
describe how the transfer from peacetime to wartime will be conducted -- who 
is responsible for what; who does what? Likewise, it has not been determined 
how mobilisation will be organised. Fortunately, this confusion will be solved in 
the near future as the Government plans to draw up an operational command 
plan for strategic-level government leadership. 
Institutions whose day-to-day business involves national defence tasks, 
expressed the view that every ministerial administrative area would retain 
command over its activities during all stages of escalation, and that the 
Government Office would oversee the cross-border command structure. In 
institutions that do not handle national defence issues on daily basis, there was 
an expectation that in the case of a serious internal or external security threat, a 
commander of the emergency would take command of the activities of their 
agencies, but it was not clear what the new command structure would look like 
at the strategic and operational political and military levels.  
All in all, leadership and command structure posed the biggest question 
mark for the experts. Some leaders of ministries and their subordinate agencies 
admitted that they did not know who would command them during some 
escalation situations (state of emergency, wartime). For example, one expert 
said that the leadership of the Rescue Board has no guidelines for a state of 
emergency or wartime -- they do not know what they should be preparing for, 
where the resources should come from, who will command them and under 
which mandate, or what their strategic mission, priorities, and tasks should be. 
Hence, arguably, they are currently unprepared for the wartime duties assigned 
to them by legislation, such as assisting in the evacuation of civilians.28 
                                                 
28
 According to the NDS (MOD, 2010), the police and rescue services must assist in the evacuation 
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Many experts pointed out the principle prescribed by the Emergency Act 
and the NDS, that the institution under whom responsibility for a particular crisis 
falls would lead the management of this crisis both during peacetime and 
wartime. For example, the Estonian Internal Security Service would lead on the 
management of a crisis caused by terrorist attacks and cybercrime. However, 
given that a terrorist or cyber attack may result in a technical disaster or 
accompany a national security threat, it is not explicit which actor should take 
overall command. National security threats are likely to involve multiple 
dimensions (internal and external security aspects, cyberspace, etc.) that may 
cause confusion with regards to the identity of the overarching leadership.  
It was also understood that during peacetime the Defence League 
supports the police and rescue services, but prior to escalation into military 
conflict the Defence League would be supported by them. However, it has not 
been considered when and how this would happen on the strategic and 
operational levels.29  
In addition to the need to explain the nature of the command structure at 
different escalation stages to the leadership of government institutions, it is 
necessary to ensure that in the case of a crisis, the command structure can be 
assembled quickly and make effective decisions. One expert proposed that 
procedures and practical regulations (Standard Operating Procedures) should be 
put in place for doing so. Another crucial aspect is the need to ensure a bottom-
up flow of information to enable effective decision-making. One expert 
suggested that the procedures of the relevant government agencies (the police, 
the Internal Security Service and others) for informing the state’s strategic 
leadership in the case of crisis should be specified and described in legal acts, as 
no regulations exist at present.  
The experts had different opinions regarding the need of aligning 
geographical division of services of various agencies, in order to ensure their 
effective coordination and collaboration during crisis or in wartime. For example, 
a representative of the MOI deemed the fact that geographical areas of service 
of the Emergency Medical Service differ from the four regions of Police and 
Border Guard Board and Regional Rescue Centres poses a problem for crisis 
management activities. At the same time, a representative of the Health Board 
regarded that the current geographical areas of the Emergency Medical Service 
are optimal and allow providing the highest quality of medical service to the 
population. He believed that if they were completely aligned with those of other 
agencies (e.g. Regional Rescue Centres and Police and Border Guard Board), the 
Emergency Medical Service’s ability to deliver its services at the required level of 
quality would be impaired. 
 III.3.7 Legal framework for integrated defence  
The NDS should be embedded in specific laws and regulations (e.g. the 
Government Act), and the statues of the ministries should be amended to 
include the responsibilities and duties stemming from the strategy. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
of the civilian population. 
29
 The Defence League has formulated a draft doctrine that will address some of these issues. 
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National Defence Act 
One government official suggested that it will not be enough to address 
only the strategic command structure and planning, but that the new Act should 
incorporate a broader view encompassing all six activity areas of the NDS within 
a single framework. The view that the National Defence Act should determine 
clear and logical responsibilities and obligations for all ministries and government 
agencies, while lesser legal means (e.g. Government decrees) should describe in 
greater detail the command structures and processes of crisis regulation during 
non-military emergencies and military situations was supported. 
Most experts outside the MOD found the method for achieving consensus 
in relation to the NDS, the Green Book and the NDDP unsatisfactory. For 
example, the leadership of the MOI felt that they were not engaged in the 
drafting process. It was also argued that actors were engaged only formally; 
there was a lack of leadership and no methodological planning instructions; and 
the classification of threat scenarios inhibited the participation of ministerial 
experts.  
National Defence Development Plan (NDDP) 2013-2022 
One positive aspect of the process of drafting the NDDP was the 
realisation, as explained by one defence expert, that the MOD, with its 
hierarchical and clear chain of command, is different from other ministries who 
sometimes regard themselves as ‘advocates of joint ventures vis-à-vis the 
government’ rather than as regulators of their policy areas,. It also appeared 
that even in 2012 the ministries were still holding the mistaken view that 
responsibility for their policy areas would change during different emergency 
situations (e.g. that ensuring the everyday provision of vital services is normally 
the responsibility of the MEAC, but would belong to MOI during emergency 
situations and MOD in wartime). Today, the ministries have largely understood 
that their roles and responsibilities will not alter in different circumstances. One 
expert suggested that the fact that the ministries have accepted the need for 
cross-sectoral long-term planning for wartime activities, while regular planning 
cycles are normally short-term during peacetime, is a positive step forward.30 
The ministries have also begun to grasp that it is not the military’s task to 
establish criteria for the wartime provision of vital services, but that each 
ministry must itself determine criteria for the whole of society within their 
respective policy areas. 
Some experts complained that the plan should have been drafted as a 
comprehensive document with the equal participation of all ministries. Today, 
the military part has been approved by the government, and the other ministries 
are forced to draw up plans on the conditions it sets out. Some respondents 
thought that the conceptual foundation of integrated national defence and the 
need for a comprehensive plan had not been sufficiently explained by the MOD; 
                                                 
30
 The planning cycle for ensuring the continous operation of vital services is short-term (plans are 
presented to a relevant authority each year) and it does not include planning for states of 
emergency or wartime. According to the Emergency Act, a risk assessment regarding continuous 
operation and a continuous operation plan should be reviewed at least once every two years 
(Riigikogu, 2009; MOI, 2010). 
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others thought the problem was over-classification, which excluded many 
working level experts.  
One problem area that the experts pointed out is the need to regulate 
the readiness of service delivery by the private sector (the providers of vital 
services) and voluntary actors during non-military emergency situations and 
war. For example, the MSA has no legal mandate to oblige privately-owned 
hospitals (joint ventures) to plan for and allocate resources for managing 
national emergencies. Fortunately, in practice this has not hindered the 
management of emergency situations. The same applies in the administrative 
area of the MEAC with regard to the providers of vital services of special 
importance for national defence.31  
Likewise, one expert anticipated that, as the Rescue Board has no 
mandate to deploy off-duty rescuers, there might be a lack of rescue workers in 
the case of a major emergency. The number of rescuers at permanent readiness 
is 350-400: if a greater number is needed, the off-duty personnel may decline to 
work. The expert recommended that an employment contract should ensure 
that a sufficient number of rescue workers can be deployed in a national security 
situation.32 A shortage of doctors could occur in one region where there has 
been a massive increase of patients due to a regional emergency, so procedures 
for transferring doctors from one region to another must be developed. 
Voluntary contributions in the defence and internal security domains 
are currently self-regulated, and more systematic top-down regulation is 
needed. With regard to voluntary rescue workers, members of the Defence 
League, and voluntary assistant police officers there is no central database to 
provide an overview of the assigned wartime positions of each individual. The 
Defence League and the police have informally agreed to start mapping the 
different organisational affiliations of their voluntary members, which will help 
to eliminate possible overlaps in planning. The Health Board and the Defence 
Resources Board should also assign wartime roles to individual doctors and their 
support personnel. Medical doctors will continue their functions in civil hospitals 
in wartime; however, measures are needed to ensure that supporting personnel 
are also not mobilised. At present, exemptions from mobilisation are agreed only 
for personnel in key coordinating functions, but one expert argued that a wider 
circle of positions should be exempted so that hospitals could continue their 
peacetime functions in wartime. For example, an exemption should be made for 
the Permanent Secretary of the MSA, who has an overall picture of the health 
care sector. 
The MSA has an obligation to ensure that vital services will be available 
during wartime, and to do so, special operational plans (toimepidevuse tagamise 
plaanid) that are being drawn up, should also consider military threat 
                                                 
31
 The problem can be solved by special laws (e.g. the Health Care Act) or Government or 
ministerial decrees once the Emergency Act has been amended to update its list of vital services. 
The MOI plans to present an amendment proposal to the government by the end of 2013 or at 
the beginning of 2014. The principle that each ministry is responsible for the vital services within 
its administrative area will not be altered. 
32
 The contracts should  ensure social security benefits for deployment in emergency situations 
that pose higher risks to safety. 
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scenarios.33 In addition, there is a need to provide regular medical care (general 
practice) during wartime in order to take the pressure from the emergency 
services and special doctors, but this issue has not yet been addressed. The 
weakest link in emergency and wartime readiness in the civilian healthcare 
system is the functioning of the general practitioners system (perearstisüsteem): 
there is no reserve of general practitioners. A joint military and civilian system 
would free some resources that could be used to establish a wartime reserve 
(with the caveat that in wartime, military doctors will not be available for civilian 
populations).34  
 III.3.8 Pooling and sharing capabilities and interoperability of 
assets  
As every actor tends to defend its independence of action and is unwilling 
to give up its authority and assets for pooling and sharing, the Government 
should set out a roadmap for pooling and sharing and the dual use of assets 
with clear deadlines and resources. The roadmap should be based on an 
independent external assessment. 
The Rescue Board has a good overview of the capabilities and assets that 
the Defence Forces could make available for crisis management and, as 
explained earlier in this chapter, civil-military interaction in civilian support to the 
military and in crisis management is good. However, there is a lack of the 
material resources (personal equipment, vehicles, etc.) required to support a 
major incident (e.g. each rescue unit does not have a reserve vehicle). Additional 
resources will be needed for the development of those capabilities that are not 
used every day.  
Like strategic planning and the coordination of inter-agency processes, 
the narrow mandates and stove-piped interests of the ministries inhibit pooling 
and sharing efforts.35 Another burden crippling pooling and sharing between the 
MOD, the MOI, and the other ministries is a lack of working-level coordination 
due, in turn, to a lack of time and resources (’we do not have the luxury of 
coordination’), and rigid and time-consuming bureaucratic and hierarchical 
ministerial working procedures. A solution would be to create cross-sectoral 
coordination mechanisms for particular policy areas (e.g. energy security, 
terrorism, cyber security, etc.). 
A framework contract on the engagement of the Defence Forces in 
supporting non-military emergencies is currently being drawn up by the Rescue 
Board and the Defence Forces. It was stressed that this framework must 
determine the conditions and practical procedures for using the Defence Forces 
and their equipment (military vehicles, cranes, air cushions, etc.), including 
                                                 
33
 According to the Peacetime National Defence Act (Riigikogu, 2002/2013), the MSA prepares for 
and organises medical care during mobilisation and wartime. The NDS states that the vital 
services for national defence are stationary special medical care, emergency care, and provision 
of blood supplies. Guidance for drawing up peacetime operational plans is given in a decree of 
the Minister of the Interior (MOI, 2010). 
34
 The impact on internal security of  coming emergency medical reform was assessed differently 
by the MOI (the reform has negative implications) and MSA (the reform has positive implications). 
It is recommended that the results of this reform should be analysed by the end of 2014. 
35
 It was suggested that the new National Defence Act should determine how pooling and sharing 
should be organised. 
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outlining lists of capabilities, and points of contacts. Even though civil-military 
interaction in the dual-use of assets has been good, there have been instances 
where military assistance was not available on request (e.g. the Defence Forces 
did not provide vehicles for the transport of euros; the Rescue Board was unable 
to use air cushions, etc.). One expert also noted that civilian (the Police and the 
Rescue Board) and military communication equipment (radios) should be 
compatible, and that there should be a single chain of logistic support (fuel, food, 
etc.). 
 III.3.9 Education, training, and exercises 
Operational and tactical inter-agency interaction was rehearsed in 2011, 
when civil protection actors participated in the European Union’s Chemical and 
Radiological Emergency Management Exercise (CREMEX). The scenario involved 
resolving a radiation, chemical and hostage emergency, including mass 
evacuation.  
All interviewed government officials strongly emphasised that the 
political leadership, top and middle-level managers of ministries and 
government agencies, and heads of municipalities must be educated and 
trained. A training course for leadership focused on integrated defence, and 
tailored seminars, should be conducted regularly. One positive example is the 8-
hour module outlining inter-agency civil-military interaction for domestic crisis 
management conducted during a mid-level staff course at the Baltic Defence 
College. The MOD has also conducted occasional information briefings for 
ministries.  
A crisis management exercise at the strategic leadership level (including 
Government ministers) based on realistic scenarios involving many 
simultaneous security threats (internal and external threats, cyber security, 
etc.) should be conducted. In addition, more joint training and exercises for the 
defence and rescue forces should be conducted to practice emergency 
situations. Exercises should be designed to test practical cooperation 
mechanisms in limited areas, rather than table-top exercises where all parties 
agree in principle, but where actions are not carried out in real physical settings. 
Host Nation Support exercises that involve the health care system have 
been extremely useful for their personnel, but a wider circle of participants 
should be engaged (e.g. all health care actors who make decisions at the working 
level in times of emergency).36  
It was suggested that the rotation of working-level civil servants 
between the military and civilian spheres would be complicated, because there is 
normally just one person on the civilian side responsible for domestic emergency 
issues, and national defence issues comprise only a tiny part of their duties: 
qualification and competency requirements for rotating personnel would thus be 
high.   
                                                 
36
 It was suggested that because the health care sector does not have capacity (and resources to 
create such capacity) to organize exercises across the health care sector, a central authority 
should run regular inter-agency exercise cycle. 
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 III.3.10 Comprehensive approach in international cooperation 
Inter-agency process regarding the deployment of Estonian troops, staff 
officers, and civilians in international missions is normally ad hoc and based on 
personal relations. It was evident from the interviews that depending on such 
networks reduced accountability and transparency in decision making. The 
leadership of the ministries were not clear how decisions were made, they noted 
a lack of information exchange, and that key actors are not engaged early 
enough in the planning and preparation of draft laws concerning international 
missions. It was stressed that some decisions are made in exclusive narrow 
circles (indicating that the decision makers do not remain open to opposing 
views).37 
It was suggested that in the preparation of draft acts to be presented by 
the Government to the Parliament concerning the deployment of Estonian 
troops in international missions, other government ministries should be 
engaged earlier, during the planning stage (there have been cases in which 
planned changes concerning the deployment of Estonian troops have not been 
communicated to other ministries). Other ministries do not recognise political 
gains from the contribution of Estonian troops or staff officers to international 
missions. 
One respondent explained that while planning of civil participation in 
international operations takes place on an ad hoc and personal relations basis, it 
remains questionable whether formalisation and institutionalisation would 
help to solve problems. It was pointed out that hospitals are reluctant to allow 
qualified surgeons to leave their jobs for deployment in international missions, 
as this results in an absence from work of more than three months. The 
deployment of top surgeons to international missions provides experience and 
helps to develop the emergency and wartime capabilities needed for 
internal/domestic defence, as well as supporting Estonia’s foreign policy goals. In 
some areas of medical care in Estonia, there are only a couple of top specialists 
and their priority and duty is to assist the Estonian population. If the military 
would like to deploy more surgeons to international missions, more specialists 
should be educated. The leadership of hospitals has, however, become more 
supportive of doctors who seek to gain mission experience.  
For many years there has been a problem in the provision of weapons for 
police officers who are deployed to international missions abroad; they will lose 
their legal status as policemen and the MFA, who recruits them, does not want 
to handle guns. While the MOI believed the legal basis has not been changed due 
to the different understandings of the ministries, the MFA felt that this was a 
technical problem. Whatever the reason, this issue has not been solved over the 
years. 
                                                 
37
 Institutionalized networks are a means to build an organization’s social capital, where ties are 
formed between the institutions and government bodies, civil society groups, thought leaders, 
individuals. OECD Public Governance Reviews: Estonia (OECD, 2011:120). 
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 Part III Conclusions  
This part of the report has described the main policy documents of and 
institutional architecture for Estonia’ integrated national defence. Based on 
interviews with key government experts, incentives for and obstacles to the 
application of a whole-of-government approach have been identified. The need 
to implement integrated national defence has been widely accepted and 
supported across all government actors. The everyday operational inter-agency 
interaction in crisis management and in the area of civilian support to the 
military is good, even though greater formalisation and regulation of interaction, 
and more practical inter-agency training and exercises, is needed in some policy 
areas. A number of best practices were outlined (civilian support to the military, 
the inter-agency risk assessment procedure, the Defence League) that can be 
further studied for possible application in other functional policy areas.  
The key obstacles to the implementation of  whole-of-government and 
whole-of-society approaches are rigid and outdated mindsets and divergent 
philosophical understandings across the ministries and their sub-agencies 
concerning the essence of integrated national defence; a lack of strategic and 
long-term planning traditions, procedures, regulations and instructions across all 
governance domains and policy subjects; a lack of competence, know-how, and 
human and financial resources that inhibits strategic planning efforts; and 
insufficient coordination of inter-agency plans and processes. The deficiencies 
with the gravest negative implications for national security are the lack of 
preparation for the assumption of wartime responsibilities and duties (no legal 
mandate, attribution of financial resources, and no strategic and operational 
planning in some policy areas); and a lack of clarity regarding the leadership and 
command structure during various stages of escalation (emergency situation, 
state of emergency, wartime). 
 Key Insights from Part III 
 There is an overall consensus and acceptance of the principles and 
objectives of integrated national defence; however, academic and 
whole-of-society discussion on a strategic vision for integrated national 
defence is needed. 
 The current conceptual and strategic documents are not suitable as 
guidelines for strategic planning. 
 Estonia’s governance structure and culture inhibits cross-sectoral policy 
planning and implementation. 
 Education about the existing civilian and military procedures and 
arrangements, and about future development plans in the entire 
security sector (including defence) should be conducted to raise 
awareness among both civilian and military actors. 
 Factors that contribute to a weak strategic planning capability are:  
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o The lack of a central integrating authority, weak planning habits, 
and uncertainty on mid- and long-term financial resources in 
policy areas other than defence; 
o The lack of strategic long-term planning traditions, practical 
guidance and in-depth expert knowledge; 
o The lack of information exchange between actors about planning 
and other initiatives; 
o Little coordination and collaboration in developing ministerial 
development plans.  
 There are many success stories in inter-agency cooperation and 
collaboration: the risk assessment procedure, civilian support to the 
military, the activities of the Defence League. 
 Earlier engagement of non-government stakeholders and more inter-
agency consensus will be needed in developing legal acts and policies on 
cross-sectoral policy subjects. 
 A number of policy issues remain to be solved by amending or enacting 
legal acts (establishing a legal mandate to ensure voluntary and private 
sector contributions in major emergencies and in wartime ensuring 
effective pooling and sharing of capabilities, etc.). 
 Factors that constrain collaboration at the strategic level are: the 
different expectations and mistrust that result from a lack of 
information; the ministries’ unwillingness to give up some independence 
and authority. 
 Although operational day-to-day inter-agency interaction is fairly good, 
the current decentralised system of managing it is rather ineffective 
and inefficient, containing potential points of failure (e.g. due to the lack 
of alignment of geographical areas of responsibility of various agencies 
with the regional crisis management structure). 
 There is some confusion regarding leadership and command structures 
during different stages of crisis escalation. 
 Decision-making concerning involvement in international operations 
lacks formal and inclusive process of consultation and decision-making. 
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Final Conclusions and Recommendations 
This report has explored the challenge of building a comprehensive security 
and integrated defence system. First, on the basis of a literature review, it has 
identified various conditions at the national, governmental, agency, team and 
individual levels that are required for successful interaction among security and 
defence stakeholders. Such interactions – especially in the advanced form of 
collaboration – lie at the heart of whole-of-government and whole-of-society 
models. Implementing these models requires broad changes, including in 
governance culture and institutional structures, in inter-agency processes and 
working practices, and in leadership styles and individual skills. Committing to 
develop a whole-of-government / whole-of-society approach is obviously an 
ambitious undertaking with very broad implications for how security and defence 
affairs should be conducted. 
Given the scope of this challenge, it is not surprising that many countries are 
making a rather slow progress towards effective whole-of-government and 
whole-of-society approaches to security and defence. This report has looked at 
how four nations – Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden – pursue 
such approaches and has found the picture to be mixed at best. Governance 
traditions, entrenched bureaucratic cultures, structural legacies and other 
factors often conspire against more rapid and effective change. However, there 
is a host of good, if not best, practices that are worth emulating in Estonia. 
Denmark demonstrates the value of a sustained political consensus on defence 
policy and of the importance of harnessing internal resources for comprehensive 
external action; Finland is a prime example of a how total defence legacy can be 
successfully adapted to an age of comprehensive security; there is much to learn 
from the Netherlands’ sophisticated, systematic and methodical approach 
towards comprehensive planning; while Sweden demonstrates the importance 
of clarity in the underlying principles and functioning of the crisis management 
system. 
     In many regards, Estonia does not appear to be a laggard in pursuing its own 
whole-of-government/whole-of-society solutions. This report has also 
investigated the ‘state of play’ in Estonia in one particular area of interest – 
integrated defence – and demonstrated that the picture is not black and white. 
The conceptual basis – the understanding of how complex and dynamic the 
threat environment is and the requirement for an integrated application of the 
resources and tools available to the nation to deal with it – is in place, if in need 
of some fine-tuning. Many legal, institutional and organisational elements are 
also emerging, reinforced by the positive experiences of operational interaction, 
including the involvement of the non-government and private sectors.  
However, there are many weaknesses too, concentrated primarily in the 
areas of: 
 strategic planning culture, and institutional competence and 
arrangements  for whole-of-government/whole-of-society 
approaches, as many organisations are driven by short-term 
budgetary cycles, do not have elaborate medium- and long-term 
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capability planning systems, and are guided mostly by their own 
narrow interests in a decentralised institutional environment;  
 availability and management of human resources, especially of 
those with deep competence in strategic planning disciplines, 
working experience in many security and defence sector 
organisations, and skills of integrating diverse inputs from various 
stakeholders into coherent strategies and plans;  
 knowledge management, especially in maintaining broad awareness 
of what various organisations do and plan for, in translating the 
implicit knowledge residing with individuals into explicit knowledge 
through manuals, handbooks and guidelines (which hampers 
‘business continuity’) and in generating and implementing system-
wide ‘lessons learned’;  
 management of inter-agency processes in security and defence 
(both in planning stages and crisis situations), with  too much  of ad 
hoc cooperation based on personal relations and informal networks, 
and too little of structured, systematic and sustained inter-agency co-
ordination and collaboration;  
 management of stakeholder expectations (e.g. concerning the 
funding sources for integrated defence preparedness measures, 
leadership roles in various processes, etc.).  
Resolving the issues in the above areas will take time, sustained effort, 
patient leadership and the good will of all stakeholders. In some cases, the 
imperative of building a more coherent and effective comprehensive security 
and integrated defence system may collide with tenets currently central to how 
Estonia is governed (e.g. ‘lean state’ with a small administrative apparatus; 
independence of ministries, etc.). But, with some creativity, modern managerial 
and technical tools and, most importantly, a genuinely whole-of-society 
approach, such collisions need not impede progress in putting into practice the 
concepts of comprehensive security and integrated defence. 
 
On the basis of the report‘s findings, it is recommended that the Parliament 
and the Government of Estonia should seek to: 
1. Promote a broad debate on the conceptual and practical aspects of whole-
of-government and whole-of-society approaches to security and defence, in 
order to achieve a greater degree of common understanding and consensus 
among various stakeholders. 
 
2. Through educational programmes (such as the Higher Defence Course), 
continue to raise awareness in security and defence stakeholders of the 
institutional arrangements, mechanisms and measures needed to ensure 
effective whole-of-government/whole-of-society collaboration, and of the 
policies, practices, capabilities and working methods of various agencies. 
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3. Significantly enhance the role of the Government’s Office as the central 
authority with overarching responsibility to co-ordinate and integrate cross-
sectoral policies and plans in security and defence and oversee their 
implementation, in support of the Government’s National Security 
Committee. 
3.1. The legal mandate of the Government’s Office should be expanded to 
ensure that it has the authority to guide and coordinate the ministries in 
conducting strategic planning for security and defence and to oversee 
progress in implementation. 
3.2. This mandate should also direct the Government’s Office to provide 
advice to the entire National Security Committee, not only the Prime 
Minister, and to make substantive inputs to its agenda. 
3.3. Establish formal procedures for formulating the agenda of the 
Committee, enacting its decisions and communicating these to various 
stakeholders, and monitoring the implementation of those decisions. 
 
4. Appoint heads of preparedness in all ministries and agencies and establish a 
regular format for them to meet, headed by the Government Office. 
 
5. Streamline whole-of-government decision-making arrangements for cross-
sectoral policies at the Government level by introducing the following 
structure: 
5.1. Political level: Government’s National Security Committee, to deal with 
crisis management, security and defence issues; 
5.2. Senior executive level: a single integrated crisis, security and defence 
council (instead of the current multiple councils and commissions), 
staffed by the permanent secretaries of the ministries and the heads of 
the relevant agencies, and tasked with executive co-ordination of all 
cross-sectoral policies, plans, resources and implementation measures; 
5.3. Expert level: permanent expert panels of government, non-government 
and private sector experts and heads of preparedness (co-ordinated by 
‘issue coordinators’ from the Government’s Office), to provide expert 
inputs to the National Security Committee. 
5.4. Regional level: expand the mandate of the current regional crisis 
committees to cover all cross-cutting security and defence issues within 
their specified geographical area (region). Turn them into the main 
platforms for operational collaboration in cross-cutting security and 
defence issues in that particular area. 
5.4.1. To the extent possible, align the activity boundaries of all agencies 
with the boundaries of the regional crisis committees. 
  
6. Engage all relevant stakeholders, especially from the non-government and 
private sectors early on when crafting cross-sectoral policies and plans. 
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7. While earmarking 2% of GDP for defence purposes, ascertain that this is, in 
line with NATO definitions, directed towards military defence and the 
development of military capabilities. However, to enable organisations other 
than the MOD to develop various measures and capabilities to perform their 
tasks during crisis and war, consider setting up a separate (i.e. not within the 
defence budget) dedicated trust fund to finance crisis and war preparedness 
projects and activities. 
7.1. This fund should be managed by the Government’s Office. 
7.2. The fund should be available not only to government agencies but also 
to non-government and private sector organisations with roles in 
comprehensive security and integrated defence (e.g. hospitals, 
companies in charge of vital infrastructure, NGOs working in the field of 
psychological support to the population, etc.). 
7.3. As a fund designed to finance non-military aspects of integrated defence, 
it would be entitled to apply for EU funding aimed at enhancing societal 
security and resilience. 
7.4. This trust fund could be either permanent or temporary. A permanent 
trust fund would, to a certain extent, relieve government organisations 
from their responsibilities for crisis and war preparedness and could 
therefore hamper long-term development. Instead, a temporary solution 
could act as a catalyst and enabler for these organisations to launch 
long-term planning activities and preparedness projects. At a later stage, 
funding would take place within the annual budget of each ministry 
responsible for a particular sector of comprehensive security and 
integrated defence. 
 
8. Establish, under the Government’s Office, a capacity-building programme to 
strengthen the strategic planning competences and capacities of government 
and non-government organisations working in the field of crisis management, 
security and defence. 
 
9. Draw a clear set of doctrinal principles and standard operating procedures 
governing stakeholder interactions (particularly for coordination and 
collaboration as the most advanced forms) in security and defence, including 
in strategic planning, pooling and sharing of capabilities, and in learning and 
applying lessons. As an example of the principles: 
9.1. The principle of responsibility: that whoever is responsible for an activity 
in normal conditions should maintain that responsibility, and initiate 
cross-sectoral actions, during crisis.  
9.2.  The principle of proximity, whereby a crisis is to be handled in the area 
in which it takes place, and be managed by those most closely affected 
and responsible. Crisis management should only be referred to higher 
levels if it is considered necessary. 
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9.3.  The principle of continuity, which means that an organisation’s activities 
and location should, as far as possible, be kept the same during a crisis. 
Changes to an organisation should be no larger than necessary in order 
to handle the crisis. 
 
10. Clarify, in legal acts and inter-agency doctrine, the roles and responsibilities 
of various actors as well as command and control arrangements for the 
entire spectrum of crisis, from emergency situation to wartime. 
 
11. Provide more training and practical exercises dealing with cross-cutting 
security and defence challenges for all actors, at all levels (political, senior 
executive, expert and regional).  
11.1. Ensure that these exercises are regular and their lessons learned 
are formalised and incorporated into the preparedness of all agencies.  
 
12. Establish a permanent inter-agency expert panel (as one of the expert level 
groups suggested earlier) to provide guidelines for and supervise technical 
integration efforts, and address interoperability issues between security and 
defence organisations. 
 
13. Better utilise the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, which already 
serves multiple end-users – security and safety agencies – as a platform for 
inter-agency training, education and research, especially in collaboration with 
the Estonian National Defence College. Both organisations have to be better 
resourced to perform this role. 
 
14. Consider introducing rotation, exchange and liaison programmes for public 
servants to facilitate their acquisition of multi-organisational awareness, 
experiences and perspectives across the security and defence sector. 
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Appendix: Terminology 
Term Defined in Estonia as Defined outside 
Estonia as 
Comments 
Civil Defence 
An essential part of 
national defence that 
involves both the timely 
notification of the 
population as well as the 
application of measures 
required to protect the 
population. Issues that 
contribute to civil defence 
are taken into 
consideration at all levels 
of national defence (MOD, 
2010) 
Preparation for and 
actual non-combatant 
assistance to individuals, 
groups or communities in 
need of immediate 
assistance as a result of 
natural or man-made 
events... (Essex-Lopresti, 
2005) 
Civil Defence is increasingly 
replaced by the term ’Civil 
Protection’, in recognition 
that preparedness of and 
assistance to a civilian 
population is necessary not 
only in wartime, but also as 
a result of other events (see 
Elomaa & Halonen, 2007). 
Thus, in essence, this term 
is converging with what is 
referred to as ‘Crisis 
Management‘ in Estonia 
(see below). It is unclear, 
however, if the Estonian 
definition of Civil Defence 
goes beyond protection of 
civilians in the event of a 
military attack. Its 
definition in the NDS 
suggests that the concept 
remains part of thinking 
about defence only in 
military contingencies and 
not in a ‘civil protection’ 
sense. 
Comprehensive 
Security 
Approach according to 
which all the factors 
influencing the nation’s 
security are considered. Its 
implementation 
encompasses all the 
sectors vital to ensuring 
national security. The main 
directions of broad-based 
security are foreign policy, 
defence policy, internal 
security policy, cohesion 
and resilience of society. 
The broad concept of 
security entails 
enhancement of the 
mutual co-operation of 
state authorities as well as 
international co-operation, 
and the involvement of 
other members of society 
in reinforcing security 
(Riigikogu, 2010). 
The end-state of a 
nation’s security policy 
achieved through the 
coordinated application 
of the multiplicity of 
government and non-
government components 
and instruments involved 
in developing and 
maintaining a stable and 
peaceful environment 
that permits the effective 
operation of political, 
economic and social 
institutions for the overall 
benefit of citizens (Fitz-
Gerald & Macnamara, 
2012: 4). 
Both definitions emphasise 
the concerted actions of 
governmental and societal 
stakeholders to ensure 
national security in multiple 
sectors. 
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Crisis 
Management 
A system of measures 
which includes preventing 
an emergency, preparing 
for an emergency, resolving 
an emergency and 
mitigating the 
consequences of an 
emergency (Riigikogu, 
2009). 
The coordinated actions 
taken to defuse crises, 
prevent their escalation 
into an armed conflict 
and contain hostilities if 
they should result (NATO 
Standardization Agency, 
2012). 
The Estonian definition 
concerns domestic events, 
while NATO (and, as a 
result of adopting NATO 
standards, the definition 
used in the Estonian 
military), focuses on ’out-
of-area’ conflicts. Indeed, 
the term ’crisis’ remains 
undefined in current 
Estonian concepts and 
legislation. 
Emergency 
An event or a chain of 
events which endangers 
the life or health of many 
people or causes major 
proprietary damage or 
major environmental 
damage or severe and 
extensive disruptions in the 
continuous operation of 
vital services and resolving 
of which requires the 
prompt co-ordinated 
activities of several 
authorities or persons 
involved by them 
(Riigikogu, 2009) 
Sudden, urgent, usually 
unexpected occurrence 
or event requiring 
immediate action. An 
emergency is usually a 
disruptive event or 
condition that can often 
be anticipated or 
prepared for but seldom 
exactly foreseen (ISO, 
2007) 
The Estonian definition 
does not consider war or a 
military attack to be an 
emergency.  In the spirit of 
Integrated Defence, 
however, it would be 
natural to suggest that the 
Crisis Management (see 
above) system is extended 
to cover the management 
of a comprehensive 
response to war or a 
military attack as a form of 
emergency. 
Integrated 
Defence 
Approach that 
encompasses all the 
options available to the 
state authorities and the 
people to ensure the 
nation’s security in the case 
of military activity against 
Estonia (Riigikogu, 2010). In 
case of military action 
against Estonia, the 
national defence system 
will be implemented 
comprehensively, 
consisting of military 
defence, civil contribution 
to military defence, 
international activity, 
ensuring of internal 
security, securing the 
resilience of critical 
services, and psychological 
defence (MOD, 2010) 
No corresponding term 
has been identified 
outside Estonia 
This term is often referred 
to as ’broad-based defence’ 
in Estonia. In essence, it is 
Total Defence (see below). 
Just as total defence, it is 
centred on countering an 
external military threat in 
different domains. As part 
of comprehensive security, 
it relies on similar principles 
to organise the nation’s 
response; it does not, 
however, cover the overall 
response to peacetime 
non-military emergencies. 
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Territorial 
Defence 
A principle <...> which 
means that defence 
encompasses the territory 
of the whole state and 
where great attention is 
devoted to the defence of 
strategically important 
objects. <...> National 
defence is organised by 
division of the territory of 
state to defence districts 
and each district is divided 
into defence regions 
(Estonian Government, 
2001). 
Defense of a country by a 
dense network of latent 
(mobilization-
dependent), relatively 
lightly armed, locally 
assigned forces. 
Territorial defense forces 
are armed forces under 
the command of military 
authorities, although by 
the nature of their tasks 
these forces must be 
more closely coordinated 
with civilian authorities 
on various levels than is 
the case for mobile strike 
forces. <...> In a sense, 
territorial defense stands 
between main battle 
forces and civil defense 
system, and its resources 
and functions are linked 
to both (Mendershausen, 
1973: 1-2). 
At the strategic level, 
Territorial Defence denotes 
the use of armed forces in 
defence of a national 
territory against a military 
attack, in contrast to the 
use of armed forces in 
expeditionary operations 
outside a national territory. 
This is the most common 
use of the term today. At 
the operational and tactical 
level, it is a doctrinal 
concept defining how the 
armed forces are organised 
and conduct their 
operations on a national 
territory; it is an alternative 
or supplement to mobile 
(manoeuvre) defence, point 
defence, frontier defence 
and other doctrinal 
concepts. At both levels, it 
is often used in conjunction 
with the Total Defence 
concept (i.e. one does not 
exclude the other). 
Total Defence 
In accordance with the 
principle of total defence, 
all means will be employed 
to anticipate and prevent 
any possible military action 
against Estonia (MOD, 
2010). 
Total defence 
encompasses the 
utilisation of all resources 
in order to maintain an 
organised, functional 
society and to protect the 
population and the 
national assets. The 
threats to be countered 
by total defence cut 
across national borders 
and the domestic 
administrative domains 
of various public 
authorities. As a result, 
threat containment 
demands joint solutions 
and close coordination 
among the accountable 
international and national 
authorities (The Danish 
Defence Agreement 
2005-2009) 
The Estonian definition 
narrowly focuses on 
military threats, while 
elsewhere the Total 
Defence concept has 
evolved to encompass the 
use of all available 
resources in relation to a 
full range of threats that 
can disrupt the functioning 
of state and society (and 
thus has become 
synonymous with 
Comprehensive Security). 
 
